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CULTURE AND THE CANADIAN
CONSTITUTIONO
By PATRICK J. MONAHAN*

This article examines the current division of powers over cultural matters in the
Canadian Constitution and the manner in which the 1992 Charlottetown Accord
would have altered that distribution. During the debate over the Charlottetown

Accord, it was argued by the federal government and the provinces that the
Constitution allocates primary legislative responsibility over cultural matters to the
provinces. Therefore, the cultural amendments in the Accord which would have
recognized the provinces' exclusive jurisdiction to make laws in relation to culture
were justified on the basis that they merely codified the status quo. This paper
challenges the belief that the provinces enjoy exclusive legislative authority in
relation to culture. It is argued that the federal government possesses quite
significant legislative authority relating to cultural matters, the most important
being its authority to pass laws in relation to matters of national concern. The
promotion and strengthening of a distinct Canadian national identity is, it is
argued, one such matter of national concern. Thus, over time, the proposed
amendments relating to culture in the Charlottetown Accord would probably have
significantly reduced federal legislative powers. Assuming that some kind of
cultural power is to be entrenched in the Constitution at all, culture should be
recognized as an area of shared or concurrent jurisdiction in which both
Parliament and the provincial legislatures have legitimate roles to play. This paper
also calls into question the whole concept of entrenching a cultural power in the

Constitution in the first place, arguing that it is unwise to recognize indeterminate
and amorphous concepts like culture as a basis for legislative authority in a federal
state.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1992 debate over the Charlottetown Accord,1 there was
relatively little public attention focused on the implications of the
Accord on cultural policy. To be sure, a number of arts groups argued
that the Accord would have shifted cultural responsibilities from Ottawa
to the provinces, and that this devolution was unacceptable. 2 But,
during the referendum campaign, public attention tended to focus
elsewhere, on issues such as Senate reform or the guarantee of 25 per
cent of the seats in the House of Commons to the province of Quebec.
When Canadians were asked to explain why they voted the way they did,
3
the cultural issue was rarely mentioned.
This low profile attached to the cultural issue can be attributed,
at least in part, to confusion over whether the Accord was even intended
to change the way in which the constitution allocated responsibility for
culture. While many cultural groups complained that the Accord would
have shifted power to the provinces, the federal government maintained
1

The Accord, intended to be a draft legal text detailing proposals for the amendment of the
Constitution of Canada, was issued on 9 October 1992. The text of the Accord is contained in the
appendices of K. McRoberts & PJ. Monahan, eds., The CharlottetownAccor4 the Referendum; and
the Futureof Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993).
2 See, for example, C. Harris, "Arts community sends a message to Ottawa: May Day rally
opposes constitutional proposals on culture" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (2 May 1992) Cl; R.
Salutin, "Premiers should rethink idiotic proposals on culture" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (17
July 1992) Cl; T. Porteous, "Forsaking Culture" Canadian Forum (October 1992).
3 See S. Henry, "Public Opinion and the Charlottetown Accord" (Canada West Foundation,
Canada 2000 Task Force, January 1993) at 4-6. See also "The Meaning of No" (Report on
Maclean's/Decima poll) Maclean's (2 November 1992) 17.
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that the amendments dealing with culture merely codified the existing
constitutional position.4 This benign interpretation of the Accord's
implications for cultural policy was accepted by at least some cultural
organizations.5 In view of these divisions within the arts community
itself, it is hardly surprising that the cultural issue failed to push any "hot
buttons" in the public consciousness and seemed to fade into the
background during the cacophonous referendum campaign.
This paper seeks to revisit the issue of culture and the Canadian
Constitution. My purpose is a limited and descriptive one. My objective
is simply to describe the way in which the Constitution currently divides
responsibility between the federal and provincial governments over
cultural matters. Such an attempt to map the status quo may be
dismissed by some as pedestrian or unimportant. But the fact is that the
recent debates over culture and the Constitution have revealed very
profound disagreements over how the Constitution currently divides
responsibility for culture. Given the lack of consensus about the status
quo, it becomes almost impossible to conduct a reasoned discussion over
the merits of any proposed amendments or reforms.
Although this paper is primarily descriptive, the analysis is not
without normative implications. In particular, any description of the
existing constitutional position in relation to culture will obviously reflect
upon the recent debate over the cultural amendments in the
Charlottetown Accord. The federal government's justification of the
Accord's cultural amendments6 depended to a very considerable extent
on the proposition that these amendments merely codified the status
quo. Thus, by describing the existing constitutional position, it becomes
4 See J. Portman, "Ottawa to keep firm grasp on arts: New Accord no threat to the c c or film
board, minister says" The Toronto Star (28 August 1992) A14. Portman quoted Communications
Minister Perrin Beatty as saying that, contrary to some media reports, "Ottawa was losing no powers
in the area of culture under the new unity accord."
5 See Canadian Conference of the Arts, "Analysis of the Legal Text of the Charlottetown
Accord" Bulletin (23 October 1992).
6 Ile reference to the "cultural amendments" in the Charlottetown Accord is to proposed ss.
92B and 92C, which were to have been inserted in the ConstitutionAct 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict,
c. 3. Section 92B would have recognized "culture in the province" as a head of provincial power,
while s. 92C provided for the negotiation of federal-provincial cultural agreements. Other aspects
of the Accord which would have indirectly affected culture (such as the requirement of a double
majority in the Senate for amendments affecting cultural matters) will not be discussed in this
paper.
It should also be noted that this paper will not discuss the CanadianCharterof Rights and
Freedoms, Part I of the ConstitutionAc 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter],and its implications for cultural regulation in any detail. The focus
here is on the division of powers between the federal and provincial governments, without reference
to the Charter.
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possible to test the extent to which the federal government's
characterization of these aspects of the Accord was accurate.
The analysis in this paper also has a number of indirect
implications for any future constitutional reforms that might be
proposed in relation to culture. By clearly delineating the status quo, we
create a benchmark against which any future constitutional changes in
the cultural field can be assessed. That such changes will be proposed at
some point in the future cannot be doubted. The word "constitution"
has ostensibly been excised from the vocabulary of all practising
Canadian politicians, even those in the province of Quebec. Yet it
would be folly to suppose that this state of affairs will be permanent, as
the election of Bloc Qu~becois leader Lucien Bouchard as Her Majesty's
Loyal Opposition in the 1993 federal election demonstrates.
The current breathing space on the constitutional front provides
an opportunity to re-examine the cultural issue in a way which was
simply impossible in the crisis atmosphere which prevailed in the fall of
1992. Freed of the tyranny of political deadlines, it becomes possible to
undertake a measured and principled analysis of the way in which
responsibility for cultural matters is allocated under the existing
Constitution. This kind of measured analysis can then serve as a
reference point in any future political discussions which might develop
on the constitutional front.
The paper is divided into three main parts. The first part
describes the changing role that governments in Canada and elsewhere
have played in the cultural domain. It is now commonplace for
governments in industrialized countries to formulate cultural policies
that are designed to assist cultural industries and promote a sense of
common values. I trace the emergence of such a strategy by the
Canadian government in the years following the Second World War. I
also describe the constitutional controversy which has always surrounded
federal involvement in this field, and the ways in which the federal
government has attempted to deflect criticisms that it was intruding on
an area of exclusive provincial jurisdiction.
The second section of the paper deals in some detail with the way
in which the cultural issue was defined and debated in the "Canada
Round" of constitutional discussions in 1991-92. What becomes evident
is that all the main players in this debate shared a common
understanding of the way in which the Constitution now allocates
responsibility for culture. The central element in this common
understanding is the belief that the Constitution allocates primary
legislative responsibility over cultural matters to the provinces. While
the most vocal proponents of this view are (understandably) the
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provincial governments themselves, even the federal government
appeared to subscribe to the notion that the provinces have primary
responsibility for cultural matters under the current Constitution.
There is an immediate and obvious problem with the idea that the
provinces have primary constitutional responsibility for cultural affairs in
Canada. The theory of provincial primacy does not seem to accurately
reflect the real world of government behaviour. The federal government
has been far more active and has had a far more pervasive impact in the
cultural field over the past forty years than have the provinces. Most of
the landmarks in government involvement in this area, including the
establishment of the Massey Commission in 1949, the Canada Council in
1957, or the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications
Commission (cRTc) in 1968, have been initiatives of the federal
government which were later copied by the provinces (in some cases).
The preponderance of the federal government in the cultural field is also
reflected in the relative expenditures by the two levels of government. In
the 1990-91 fiscal year, the federal government spent a total of over $2.8
billion in the cultural field, which was over $1 billion more than the
expenditures of all the provinces combined. 7 Within the province of
Quebec alone, the federal government spent almost two-thirds more
than the provincial government.8 Given the dominant role of the federal
government, how can it be that the provinces are supposedly the primary
custodians of cultural responsibilities under the current constitution?
The key element in the explanation is based on a distinction
between legislative or regulatory responsibility on the one hand, and the
exercise of the so-called federal spending power on the other. While the
federal government is obviously more active in the cultural field, this is
said to be a product of the power of the federal government's purse-its
spending power-rather than a reflection of the true division of
constitutional responsibilities between the two levels of government.
The spending power, of course, refers to the ability of the federal
government to spend, lend, or contract in areas of exclusive provincial
jurisdiction. The most obvious use of this power is the system of federal
grants to the provinces for use in areas of exclusive provincial

7 Letter of N. Verma, Project Manager, Government Expenditures on Culture Project,
Culture Statistics Program, Statistics Canada to the author (5 March 1993). The data for the 199091 fiscal year are the most recent available at the time of writing.
8 Jbk Federal spending in Quebec in 1990-91 amounted to $877.5 million; provincial
spending was $536.3 million.
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jurisdiction, such as health care, social welfare, and education. 9 The
extensive federal involvement in the cultural field, which to a large
extent consists of federal grants or contributions, is thus characterized as
simply another illustration of the ability of the federal government to
expend funds in areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction. Indeed,
characterizing the federal involvement in cultural matters in this manner
creates the impression that Ottawa is somehow intruding into an area
which is implicitly reserved to the provinces. This leads to arguments
that some kind of restrictions or limits ought to be placed on the ability
of the federal government to expend monies in the cultural field.
This orthodoxy went virtually unchallenged throughout the
discussions leading up to the Charlottetown Accord. All the significant
governmental players in the 1991-92 process began with the assumption
that the current Constitution allocates primary responsibility over
cultural matters to the provinces. Federal involvement in cultural
matters was typically assumed to be based on the federal spending power
rather than on any grant of direct legislative authority. The main area of
disagreement in the Charlottetown process appeared to be over the
question of whether the federal spending power was a legitimate basis
for past or future federal involvement in this area.
In the third section of the paper, I critically examine this
conventional wisdom regarding the constitutional primacy of the
provinces. I suggest, contrary to the current orthodoxy, that it is simply
wrong to characterize the provinces as possessing primary jurisdiction
over cultural matters. I argue that the current constitutional position
regarding culture can be described in the following manner:
1. There is no distinct cultural power under the existing
Constitution. The division of powers in 1867 did not
contemplate direct regulation of cultural affairs by either the
federal or provincial governments.
2. Although there is no distinct cultural powerper se, both levels of
government have very extensive authority to legislate in ways
which affect culture. This is because many of the existing powers
possessed by each level of government authorize legislation with
cultural purposes or impact.
3. The very extensive federal involvement in the cultural field is not
based simply on the exercise of the federal spending power.
Rather, federal involvement is based on a number of specific
heads of authority, the most important of which is its authority to
9 See, for example, the Federal-ProvincialFiscalArrangements and FederalPost-Secondary
EducationandHeafth ContributionsAct,R.S.C. 1985, c. F-8.
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pass laws in relation to matters of "national concern." 10 The
promotion and strengthening of a distinct Canadian national
identity is, I argue, one such matter of national concern.
Thus, it is wrong to argue that the provinces have primary
jurisdiction over cultural matters, and that the federal activity in
this area has no sound constitutional foundation. The goal of
strengthening Canada's national identity provides the
constitutional authority for a wide range of federal legislation
and expenditures in the cultural area.
The proposed amendments in relation to culture in the
Charlottetown Accord would probably have reduced federal
legislative authority in this area. The Charlottetown
amendments seemed to assume that federal authority in the
cultural field was limited to the exercise of the federal spending
power. There was no recognition of the authority of the federal
Parliament to pass laws promoting the Canadian national
identity. At the same time, there was explicit recognition of a
provincial legislative authority in relation to culture, and the
proposed cultural agreements were to "recogniz[e] the lead
11
responsibility of the province for culture in the province."
Over time, these amendments would likely have reduced the
effective authority of the federal Parliament and government,
particularly its authority to promote a distinct national identity.
It is questionable whether a distinct cultural power should be
entrenched in the Constitution at all. The Supreme Court of
Canada has, especially in recent years, cast doubt on the wisdom
of recognizing indeterminate and amorphous concepts like
inflation or environment as a basis for legislative authority.
Culture would appear to be at least as indeterminate as these
other matters and would be inconsistent with this emerging
Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Assuming that some kind of cultural power is to be entrenched
in the Constitution at some point in the future, culture should be
recognized as an area of shared or concurrent jurisdiction in
which both Parliament and the provincial legislatures have
legitimate roles to play. Recognizing culture as an area of
functional concurrency would be a far more accurate reflection

10

Federal authority to legislate in relation to matters of "national concern" is one aspect of its
so-called residual power, the authority to pass laws for the "Peace, Order and Good Government of
Canada." See discussion infra at text accompanying notes 95-100.
11 See proposed section 92C, infra note 68.
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of the existing constitutional position than were the amendments
proposed in the Charlottetown Accord.
This analysis offers some important lessons which ought to be
kept in mind in any future debates over constitutional reform. One
important lesson is that there is no substitute for very careful analysis
and understanding of the existing constitutional position before
proposing possible reforms. I suggest that the debate over culture in the
Charlottetown Accord proceeded on the basis of a misconception about
the nature of federal authority in this area. This misconception-that
the provinces have primary authority over culture-produced
amendments which were said to be a mere codification of the status quo.
In fact, however, these amendments had the potential to significantly
reduce or erode federal authority. This was a result which most of the
key players in the debate-including the Prime Minister of Canada and
the federal Communications Minister-repeatedly claimed they wished
to avert. What this reveals is the extent to which the full implications of
the proposed amendments may not have been grasped even by some of
their authors.
A second important lesson which emerges from this analysis
relates to the process of constitutional reform. The analysis in this paper
focuses on one very small and narrow aspect of what was a vast package
of amendment proposals presented to Canadians. But there is no reason
to suppose that the misconceptions and miscalculations which were
evident in the cultural context were an isolated phenomenon. It seems
safe to assume that the implications of many other aspects of the Accord
were imperfectly understood, even by the government decision makers
who drafted the Accord. That such misconceptions would arise is not
surprising, given the vast range of matters under consideration and the
extremely short time-frame within which the Accord was negotiated. Of
course, our knowledge of the implications of any proposed constitutional
amendments will always be imperfect, regardless of the process that is
utilized. But the potential for misconceptions and mistakes is increased
dramatically when the package is as vast and all encompassing as was the
Charlottetown Accord. A far more prudent and responsible approach
would be to proceed in a limited and incremental fashion, permitting
adequate time for careful consideration and debate of the implications
of what is being proposed.
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II. BACKGROUND: THE CHANGING ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
IN THE CULTURAL FIELD
A. Culture and the ConstitutionAc4 1867
The term "culture" does not appear in the catalogue of federal
and provincial powers in sections 91 and 92 of the ConstitutionAc4 1867.
The absence of any reference to jurisdiction over culture is hardly
surprising, for at least two reasons. First, the drafters of the Constitution
Ac4 1867 had a conception of the appropriate role of government which,
to modem eyes at least, appears extremely limited. Government in midnineteenth century England (and its colonies) was seen as primarily
focused on such matters as administering justice, ensuring collective
defence, collecting taxes, and providing an infrastructure for economic
development. The suggestion that government ought to regulate or
promote the cultural development of the nation, had such a suggestion
ever been made, would have been regarded as ludicrous. 1 2 Lord
Melbourne's 1835 dictum, "God help the Minister that meddles with
art,"1 3 was one of the self-evident truths of public policy for nineteenthcentury British and colonial politicians.
Yet even if the nineteenth-century view of government had been
more expansive, there would have been a second, equally fundamental
objection to the idea of including culture as a head of legislative
authority in the Constitution Act, 1867. The term "culture" is so
indeterminate and all-encompassing that its inclusion in either sections
91 or 92 of the Act would have rendered the entire division of powers
almost incoherent. While the term "culture" is notoriously difficult to
define, experts in the study of culture commonly describe it in broad
terms, such as "the broad spectrum of human activities, symbols, values,
and artifacts that identify a human group and distinguish it from
others."14 Other definitions suggest that culture is a "collective way of

12 See discussion in 3. Minihan, The Nationalization of Culture: The Development of State
Subsidies to the Arts in GreatBritain (New York: New York University Press, 1977) at 40. For a
discussion in the context of the ConstitutionAct, 1867, see B. Ostry, The Cultural Connection:An
essay on Cultureand Government Policy in Canada (Toronto: McCleland and Stewart, 1978) 17-29.
1
3 As quoted in Minihan, ibid. at 60.
14

R. Stavenhagen, The Ethnic Question: Conflicts, Development and Human Rights (Tokyo:
United Nations University Press, 1990) at 2.
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being."15 If this definition of culture is accepted, it would appear that
virtually all government activity could be seen as falling within the
cultural realm. Because almost everything government does affects,
directly or indirectly, our "collective way of being," it follows that
"[e]very government decision, every public action, entails cultural
16
implications."
To illustrate this proposition, consider the wide variety of
legislation which, although not normally regarded within the category of
cultural policy, affects directly our "collective way of being." The
Canada Health Act,17 for example, is nominally about health care
funding. But it is also a law about culture in the sense that medicare is
thought to be a defining feature of the Canadian identity. The CanadaUnited States Free Trade Agreement18 is nominally a treaty regulating
trade relations, but it also involves a very important choice about our
"collective way of being" and, hence, our cultural identity.1 9 The
.National TransportationAct20 is nominally about the regulation of
transportation, but it also involves culture in the sense that certain
modes of transportation (particularly railways) have come to be seen as
vital to the Canadian way of life. There are countless other examples
which are not usually classified as cultural, but which have important and
direct cultural significance. The point is simply that it is impossible to
draw a bright-line boundary around cultural policy or cultural
legislation. Because the concept of culture is itself so amorphous and
all-encompassing, laws which at first glance are regarded as outside of
the cultural realm are, on closer examination, of direct cultural
15

See The Task Force on Canadian Unity, Coming to Terms: The Words of the Debate (Hull:
Minister of Supply and Services, 1979) (co-chairs: J.-L Pepin & J.Robarts) at 4, which offered the
following definition of culture:
In day-to-day usage, culture is often considered to be the intellectual and artistic aspect
of life in a community or society.
Culture has a broader meaning, however, when related to the character of the whole
community. In this context, culture may be defined as the sum of the characteristics of a
community acquired through education, training and social experience. It includes
knowledge in all fields, language, traditions and values. It adds up to a collective way of
thinking, feeling, and doing, a collective way of being.
16
Ostry, supra note 12 at 14.
17

S.C. 1984, c. 6.

18 22 December 1987, Can. T.S. 1989 No. 3, (1988) 27 I.L.M. 281 [hereinafter Free Trade
Agreement].
19 This is recognized in the Free Trade Agreement itself, which specifically exempts "cultural
industries" from its provisions. See Free TradeAgreement, 2 January 1988, art. 2005.
20
R.S.C. 1985, c. N-17.
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relevance. In this sense, virtually all government policy could be
characterized as cultural policy, in the sense that it affects who we are
and how we see ourselves as a society.
This observation is important in terms of the division of powers
in a federal state such as Canada. Because there is such a wide variety of
laws which directly affect a society's culture, allocating exclusive
authority over culture to one government would appear to be
inconsistent with the very idea of a federal division of powers. If a single
level of government were granted exclusive authority over culture, it
would be the equivalent of allowing the entire field of legislative activity
to be the exclusive preserve of a particular order of government.
The fact that the term "culture" was not used in the Constitution
Ac4 1867 meant, in effect, that either level of government was free to
enact laws with cultural impact. Of course, government is always
required to demonstrate that any particular piece of legislation flows
from some specific authority contained in the ConstitutionAc4 1867.
But, assuming such a proper constitutional foundation, the fact that a
law might affect culture was simply irrelevant for constitutional
purposes. The federal ImmigrationAct,21 for example, would obviously
have important cultural impact, in the sense that successive waves of
immigrants in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries would
bring their traditions to Canada and, in the process, redefine our
"collective way of being." But since section 95 of the ConstitutionAct,
1867 made it clear that immigration was a matter of concurrent
jurisdiction, the cultural impact of immigration laws was simply beside
the point: either level of government was free to regulate immigration,
subject to the paramountcy of federal laws in cases of inconsistency.
Another way of expressing this point is that culture is not a category with
any constitutional significance under the 1867 ConstitutionAct. Either
level of government is perfectly free to enact laws which might directly
affect culture, as long as there is an appropriate constitutional
foundation for such laws in the Act. This, simply put, is the
constitutional position as established by the 1867Act.
B. Contemporary Government Regulationof Culture
Over the course of the past century, our understanding of the
proper role of government has changed fundamentally. Modern
governments have assumed responsibility for a vast array of matters that,
21 1976-77, c. 52.
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a century ago, would have been regarded as the preserve of the private
sector. One aspect of this transformation is the way in which
governments have come to assume responsibility for promoting cultural
development. Whereas mere decades ago cultural development was
seen as a matter best left to individuals and groups in society, today
governments the world over regard cultural policy as an important part
of their mandate. As one recent survey concluded, "Every major
industrial nation now has a significant cultural or arts policy which
involves the expenditure of significant sums of money and is able to have
a real impact on cultural development and distribution." 22
While all western governments now assume an active role in
promoting cultural development, Canadian governments have come to
see cultural policy as a particularly important part of their mandate.23
This Canadian emphasis on cultural policy is a result of the pressures
and challenges facing the development of a distinct Canadian identity.
Canada is an ethnically and culturally mixed society with a small
population spread over an immense territory. We are located next to
the culturally vital United States, a society with whom most Canadians
share a language and have increasingly close economic and political ties.
At the same time, our traditional links to the United Kingdom, which for
many Canadians provided a basis for a distinctive Canadian tradition,
have become increasingly attenuated. These and other developments
have meant that Canadians, particularly since 1945, have seen their own
sense of collective identity increasingly called into question. This, in
turn, has produced the universally shared assumption that Canadian
governments have a vital role to play in defending our collective cultural
autonomy. The 1951 Report of the Massey Commission represented the
watershed event in this regard, in the sense that it "crystallized a
that, unlike its southern neighbour, the
Canadian train of thought ...
government of Canada had a role to play in fostering culture as it had in
building roads, railways and communication systems." 24 Four decades
later, the proposition which was regarded as a novelty in 1951 has
become the primary article of faith of Canada's cultural community.
Today, the "single pivotal principle of arts policies in Canada ...
[is] that

22 See M.C. Cummings, Jr. & R.S. Katz, "Government and the Arts: An Overview" in
Cummings & Katz, eds., The PatronState: Government and the Arts in Europe, NorthAmerica and
Japan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987) at 9.
23 See generally, J. Meisel & J. Van Loon, "Cultivating the Bushgarden: Cultural Policy in
Canada," in Cummings & Katz, eds, supra note 16 at 276.
24
Ostry, supra note 12 at 77.
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the arts are of public concern and therefore within the jurisdiction of
public policy."25
As the Canadian government began to assert a responsibility for
promoting cultural development in the post-war years, questions about
constitutional authority in this field began to surface. Whenever the
federal government asserted responsibility to promote culture on the
national level, it was met by suggestions that this would intrude into an
area of exclusive provincial jurisdiction. It was never entirely clear how
such an intrusion would arise since, as we have seen, there was no
explicit reference to jurisdiction over culture in the 1867 Constitution
Act.26 Moreover (as noted above), both levels of government had, since
1867, been enacting laws which directly affected the country's cultural
development. The only thing that had changed was that governments
were now explicitly acknowledging a responsibility for promoting
cultural development.
As the federal government began to define its new role in
relation to cultural development, it sought at every turn to reassure the
provinces that this federal responsibility would not intrude into areas of
provincial jurisdiction. The Order-in-Council (oic) establishing the
Massey Commission in 1949 illustrates the caution and restraint which
characterized the early federal efforts in this field. The oic begins by
reciting the fact that it is "in the national interest to give encouragement
to institutions which express national feeling, promote common
understanding, and add to the variety and richness of Canadian life,
rural as well as urban."2 7 But this suggestion is apparently far from
novel since, as the oic continues, "there exist already certain Federal
agencies and activities which contribute to these ends."28 Thus, while it
is desirable that an inquiry be held into these "Federal agencies and
activities," such inquiry would be conducted with "full respect for the
'29
constitutional jurisdiction of the provinces.
This careful wording suggests that the Royal Commission was
nothing more than a refinement of existing federal policy that would
pose no threat to the provinces. Notice, in particular, that the oic
25

Meisel & Van Loon, supranote 23 at 306.
26 Itwould appear that the provinces took the position that a federal role in the cultural field
would conflict with provincial jurisdiction over education. But this provincial argument was open to
serious question. See the discussion below at text accompanying notes 28-30.
27
P.C. 1786, reproduced in Report Royal Commission on NationalDevelopment in the Ars,
Lettersand Sciences (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1951) at xi [hereinafter Royal Commission].
28
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describes the national role rather narrowly, as involving "institutions"
that will encourage the expression of national feeling and common
understanding. The oic then points out that many such institutions
already exist, and that the Royal Commission will merely recommend
"their most effective conduct."30 There is no suggestion that the federal
responsibility extends beyond existing institutions or, for that matter,
that the federal government might have a broader policy role in this
area, quite apart from specific federal institutions or agencies. There is
no mention of any general federal responsibility to promote national
values or to strengthen ties amongst Canadians.
Further, one is left slightly puzzled by the reference to the fact
that the inquiry will be conducted with "full respect for the constitutional
jurisdiction of the provinces." No attempt is made to define the nature
or extent of this provincial jurisdiction, or to explain how such authority
might be compromised by the conduct of the Massey Commission. One
might have thought, for example, that the establishment of federal
institutions to "express national feeling, promote common
understanding and add to the variety and richness of Canadian life"
would, by definition, be a matter which could not possibly interfere with
the role of the provinces. The promotion of "national feeling" seems a
matter which necessarily extends beyond the mandate of any particular
province and is a responsibility which could only be undertaken by a
national government. The fact that it was thought necessary to include
this genuflection in the direction of the provinces is a telling sign of the
extreme hesitation which governed Ottawa's official attitude towards
these issues.
When the Massey Commission reported two years later, it
31
returned to these same themes in its opening chapter. But Massey,
unlike the federal cabinet headed by Louis St. Laurent, was much less
reticent about asserting the necessity for active federal involvement in
the promotion of Canadian culture. On the opening page of the Report,
Massey made it clear that it was not particularly concerned about the
narrow way the government had framed its terms of reference. Massey
observed that, according to the strict terms of the oic, its mandate was
simply to examine "certain national institutions and functions and to
make recommendations regarding their organization."32 Nevertheless,

30

i&

31 The reference to Massey is intended to denote the entire Commission, as opposed to its
Chair personally.
32

Royal Commission,supranote 27 at 3.
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according to Massey, while the oic defined its "primary duty," there was
a broader aspect to the mandate: "The agencies and functions with
which we were required to deal are only certain threads in a vast
fabric."33 In order to appreciate the meaning and importance of these
"certain threads," the Commission had to inquire into the "vast fabric"
into which they had been woven. In short, in order to fulfil the terms of
reference, the Commission had found it necessary to undertake a
"general survey of the arts, letters and sciences in Canada, to appraise
present accomplishments and to forecast future progress." 34
Having discovered in its apparently narrow terms of reference
the necessity to undertake this vast and sweeping general survey, Massey
illustrated yet again the universal tendency of Royal Commissions to
exceed their original mandates. But, in this instance at least, Canadians
have reason to be grateful that Massey chose to overlook the wording of
its oic and undertake a general survey of the field. The resulting Report
represents nothing short of an intellectual and political tour de force
which continues, forty-two years later, to guide public policy in the field.
Having staked out its territory, Massey moved on to point out
that governments in the middle of the twentieth century have come to
assume a new role in relation to culture. This new role, while "not
foreseen a generation ago," has now come to be accepted "in all civilized
countries whatever political philosophy may prevail. 3 5s Massey
explained that what is new is that governments have come to accept
"official responsibility" for cultural development of their societies.3 6
Massey pointed out that it was particularly important for the
Canadian government to embrace wholeheartedly this new
responsibility. Massey claimed that Canada was in a unique position,
since it alone faced three great challenges which impeded the
development of a distinctive Canadian way of life. First, Canada has "a
small and scattered population in a vast area;" second, Canadians are
"clustered along the rim of another country many times more populous
and of far greater economic strength;" and third, a majority of
Canadians share their mother tongue with Americans, "which leads to
peculiarly close and intimate relations."37 The upshot of these three
conditions was to create a situation of Canadian cultural dependency, in
33
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35
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371bid.Chapter II, "The Forces of Geography" at 11.
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which some Canadians were uncritically "accepting tacit direction from
New York that they would not think of taking from Ottawa."38 Massey
traced the pernicious effects of this cultural dependency on our schools,
universities, publishers, broadcasters, periodicals, and institutions. In
1948, for example, there were only 14 works of fiction published in
Canada, compared to 1,102 in the United States and 1,830 in Britain. s9
The Commission proposed that only a concerted policy at the national
level could possibly hope to counter these American influences and to
develop an indigenous cultural community.
But what of the provincial governments and of the concern
expressed in the 1949 Massey oic over provincial jurisdiction? Massey
observed that this problem had "troubled a number of those presenting
briefs to us," and that it was "of sufficient importance to warrant
attention at the beginning of this Report." 40 Massey explained that what
seemed to be troubling the provinces was that an expanded federal role
in cultural affairs would interfere with provincial jurisdiction over
education. 41 But, according to Massey, these concerns were misplaced.
Provincial jurisdiction extends to. "formal education" in schools and
universities. The Commission was concerned with "general nonacademic education through books, periodicals, radio, films, museums,
art galleries, lectures and study groups." 42
The Commission advanced two reasons justifying active federal
involvement in regulating and promoting "general non-academic
education." The first was technical and tentative. Massey observed that
there was no law prohibiting anyone from contributing to the general
education of the individual. Since no such prohibition existed, activities
of the federal government in advancing Canadian cultural development
"[were] not in conflict with any existing law." 43 This seems an odd
rationale for justifying federal involvement in cultural affairs, since it is
entirely negative and fails to provide any positive justification for federal
responsibility. Massey went on to offer a second rationale which, while
speaking in more positive terms, also seems somehow beside the point.
38

Ibid. at 15.
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Ibid. at 228. Massey also noted that, in addition to these works of fiction, there were a total
of thlrty-five Canadian books of poetry and drama and a mere six "general" books published in
Canada in 1948.
40

Tkid at6.
41 ConstitutionAc4 1867,supra note 6, s. 93.
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Massey suggested that all civilized societies strive for a common good,
which includes "not only material but intellectual and moral elements." 44
If the federal government renounces its right to promote general
education and the common good, then it "denies its intellectual and
moral purpose."45 This, according to Massey, means that Canada would
become a "materialistic society."'46
Presumably, the spectre of materialism, driven by vast cultural
importation from south of the border, was a frightening prospect to
Canada at mid-century. Federal involvement in cultural affairs could,
therefore, be justified through an appeal to this anti-materialistic
consensus. Yet if such a consensus existed (even at the elite level) in the
1950s, it seems doubtful that it has survived into the globalized 1990s.
Also, Massey seemed to overlook a much more straightforward
justification for a federal role in cultural affairs which continues to ring
true today. This is simply the fact that Canadian culture cannot hope to
survive, much less flourish, without active intervention by the national
government. Because of the particular challenges facing Canada,
47
challenges which Massey itself outlined elsewhere in masterful fashion,
"national unity cannot be regarded as a foregone conclusion." 48 A
coherent effort to foster common values amongst Canadians was
essential to the very survival of the nation.
Although Prime Minister St. Laurent carried the Massey Report
careful to say no one in the
into the House of Commons "with tongs ...
government had read it," the government eventually implemented
almost all its recommendations in one form or another. 49 In the forty
years since the Massey Commission brought down its landmark report,
the federal government has put in place an ambitious and far-reaching
programme of support and regulation of cultural activity. Federal
involvement includes direct regulation, either by the government itself or
through agencies such as the C'RTc and the Copyright Board;50 grants, tax
44
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Government regulation in the cultural field is often directed at restricting foreign control or
domination of various Canadian cultural industries. See, for example, the so-called "Baie-Comeau
Policy" adopted in 1985 to control foreign investment in the Canadian book publishing industry
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expenditures, 51 and subsidies to cultural institutions or artists often
administered through arms-length agencies like the Canada Council;52
and public ownership of institutions like the Canadian Broadcasting
Corporation (CBC). 53

The ever-expanding role of the federal

government reflects the belief that cultural development is "the essence
of our national being and the [instrument] of our identity as a
country,"5 4 but that this identity will atrophy without vigorous state
support.
As the federal role in the cultural field has expanded
dramatically over the past thirty years, there have been complaints from
time to time that some of these initiatives intruded on provincial
jurisdiction.55 Yet even the staunchest defenders of provincial rights
have recognized the necessity for some form of continuing federal role
in cultural affairs. For example, the Quebec Liberal Party's Beige Paper,
published in 1980, proposed that the provinces be granted a general
legislative power in relation to cultural matters while, at the same time,
conceding that the federal government ought to have specific powers
necessary to protect and develop the cultural identity of all Canadians. 6
This federal authority included the power to create or maintain national

Comunications Canada, News Release 92-5201E (28 January 1992).
51 For example, in 1976 the Income TaxAct R.S.C. 1952, c.148, regulations were amended to
allow for a greater rate of capital cost allowance on investments made in Canadian films (SOR/76748). In 1976, Bill C-58,AnAct toAmend the Income TaxAct, 1st Sess., 30th Parl., 1974-75-76, was
proclaimed so as to disallow, for Canadian income tax purposes, advertising expenditures made in
foreign magazines and on foreign television stations.
52
The Canada Council initiated direct federal support to cultural industries after 1957. This
was extended in 1968 with the establishment of the Canadian Film Development Corporation, later
to become Telefilm Canada. In recent years, the government has introduced a programme of
support for the sound recording industry and established a Cultural Industries Development Fund,
administered by the Federal Business Development Bank.
53 For an overview of the range of activities currently undertaken by the federal, provincial,
and municipal governments in the cultural field, see Report of the Standing Committee on
Communications and Culture: Culture and Communications:The Ties that Bind (Ottawa: House of
Commons, 7 April 1992) [hereinafter 7es], especially c. 2, "The Role of Governments." See also
Statistics Canada, Government Expenditures on Culture in Canada: 1982-83 to 1986-87 Culture
Statistics (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1990) at 11-16 [hereinafter Government
Expenditures].
54

See T7es, supranote 53 at 26.

55 See P.E. Trudeau, "Federal grants to universities" in Federalism andthe French Canadians
(Toronto: Macmiillan, 1968) at 79.
56 See The Constitutional Committee of the Quebec Liberal Party, A New Canadian
Federation (Beige Paper) (Montreal: 1980) at recommendations 15(4),(5) and (6) [hereinafter Beige
Paper].
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institutions such as the cBc, the National Film Board, and the National
Art Gallery.
Other reform proposals developed during the constitutional
discussions of the late 1970s and early 1980s, if they discussed
jurisdiction over culture at all, were to the same effect-culture was an
area of shared jurisdiction, with both levels of government playing a
legitimate and necessary role. The 1979 Report of the Pepin-Robarts
Task Force on Canadian Unity,5 7 which was among the more
decentralist proposals of this era, observed that "[t]he central
government has for many years been the prime mover in Canadian
cultural and artistic life," and that Ottawa has played "an invaluable
pioneering role in many crucial fields [relating to culture] which might
otherwise have been neglected."58 Moreover, the central government "is
the only government in Canada which has the resources and the breadth
of perspective to develop cultural programs directed at the country as a
whole."'5 9 Pepin-Robarts concluded that "[c]learly both orders of
government have important responsibilities in the cultural field ...
"60 In
particular, the Task Force recommended that any adjustments to the
division of powers should take account of the fact that the federal
government has a responsibility to strengthen the Canadian identity.61
Pepin-Robarts also recommended that the federal government be
recognized as having a responsibility to preserve and to enhance the
integrity of the Canadian state. 62 While the Task Force also recognized
similar roles for the provinces, in general terms it would have left culture
as an area of concurrent jurisdiction.
These and other proposals dealing with jurisdiction over culture
were never the subject of serious negotiations by governments during the
"patriation round" of constitutional reform. 63 The primary focus of the
bargaining between governments in the 1980-82 period was over the
entrenchment of a charter of rights and a new domestic amending
57

A Future Together: Observationsand Recommendations (Hull: Minister of Supply and
Services, 1979) [hereinafterA Future Together].
58 1bid at 60.
59 Iid.

60bid
61 ibia at 85.
62

Ibid at 125.

63 The "patriation round" began in the spring of 1980 after the re-election of the Trudeau
government in the February 1980 general election, and concluded with the signing of the Canada
Act 1982 by the Queen in Ottawa on 17 April 1982.
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formula. In the ConstitutionAc4 1982, culture is mentioned in only two
instances; but in neither case is there any substantive change in the
division of powers. Section 27 of the Charter provides that the Charter
shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and
enhancement of the "multicultural heritage of Canadians." But,
whatever the scope or import of this clause, it does not apply to the
ConstitutionAc4 1867 and, thus, cannot affect the division of powers.
The only other mention of culture in the ConstitutionAc4 1982 is found
in section 40, which deals with amendments transferring provincial
legislative powers "relating to education or other cultural matters."
However, section 40 merely grants a provincial right to compensation in
the event that provinces agree to transfer powers relating to cultural
matters at some point in the future. It does not purport to effect any
change in the existing distribution of legislative authority, nor does it
even attempt to define what might be included within the term "cultural
matters."64
Similarly, the Meech Lake discussions between 1987 and 1990
did not deal with jurisdiction over culture. Quebec's five conditions,
which formed the basis for the Accord, made no mention of federalprovincial jurisdiction over culture.65 Other items added to the agenda
during the ensuing three-year debate included Senate reform,
Aboriginal rights, a "Canada Clause," and gender equality.6 6 But
jurisdiction over culture did not even make it to the long list of items for
the "second round" of constitutional discussions which was to have
followed the ratification of the Accord.
III. CULTURE AND THE CHARLOTTETOWN ACCORD
In the recent "Canada Round" of constitutional discussions,
culminating in the Charlottetown Accord of 28 August 1991,
governments for the first time agreed to entrench a cultural power in the
Constitution. The Charlottetown Accord proposed to add a new section
(92B) to the ConstitutionAc4 1867 stating that the provincial legislatures
"may exclusively make laws in relation to culture in the province." The

64 For a discussion of the meaning of section 40, see P.W. Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw of
Canada,3rd ed. (Scarborough: Carswell, 1992) 76-77.
65 For a description and discussion of the Quebec proposals, see P. Monahan, Meech Lake:
The Inside Story (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991) at 54-62.
66 See, generally, Final Communiqu6, First Ministers' Meeting on the Constitution, 9 June
1990, reprinted in Monahan, ibid at 306-14.
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same section would also have provided that the Government of Canada
"retains its role in relation to national cultural matters, including
national cultural institutions and grants and contributions delivered by
such institutions." 67 A separate section provided that the Government
of Canada would negotiate cultural agreements with any province that
so requests, so as to ensure that "both governments work in harmony,
recognizing the lead responsibility of the province for culture in the
' 8
province."
The drafters of the Accord, including Constitutional Affairs
Minister Joe Clark, sought to downplay the apparent novelty of
proposed sections 92B and 92C by arguing that they merely entrenched
the constitutional status quo. Of course, one must always be rather
sceptical of such predictions, since the ultimate meaning and impact of
constitutional provisions will be determined by the courts, and not by
politicians. 69 In any event, in order to assess the correctness of this
particular claim it would be necessary to clarify the drafters'
understanding of the existing constitutional position. If it turned out
that the drafters' understanding of the status quo was itself incomplete or
misleading, then there would be little reason to suppose that these
amendments would be as innocuous as was being claimed.
The origins of the cultural amendments in the Charlottetown
Accord can be traced to the Quebec Liberal Party's Allaire Report
published in January 1991.70 The Allaire Committee was established by
67

68

Proposed section 92B provided as follows:
(1) The legislature of each province may exclusively make laws in relation to culture in
the province.
(2) The Government of Canada retains its role in relation to national cultural matters,
including national cultural institutions and grants and contributions delivered by
such institutions.
(3) Nothing in subsection (2) extends the authority of the Parliament of Canada.

Proposed section 92C provided as follows:
(1) The Government of Canada shall negotiate with the government of any province
that so requests an agreement on culture for the purpose of ensuring that both
governments work in harmony, recognizing the lead responsibility of the province
for culture in the province.
(2) The Government of Canada shall negotiate with the government of any territory
that so requests an agreement on culture for the purpose of ensuring that both
governments work in harmony.
69 The courts have made this explicit, holding that the intentions of the drafters of the
Constitution have minimal weight in their legal interpretation. See Refernce Re Section 94(2) of the
Motor VehideAct R.S.B.C. 1979, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486.
70 SeeA Quibec Free to Choose; Report of the ConstitutionalCommittee of the Qutibec Liberal
Party (Quebec Constitutional Committee of the Qu6bec Liberal Party. 1991) (Chair J. Allaire)
[hereinafter Allaire Report].
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Premier Robert Bourassa to develop a new constitutional position for
the Quebec Liberal Party following the failure of the Meech Lake
Accord. The Committee's Report concluded that there must be a
profound decentralization of powers in favour of the provinces if
Canadian federalism were to meet the challenge of the 1990s. One of its
main recommendations was that Quebec should exercise "exclusive,
discretionary and total authority in most fields of activity." 71 One of the
areas which would be "repatriated" to Quebec would be the field of
culture. The Report noted that the two levels of government compete
with each other in the field of culture, "leaving the way open to oneupmanship, conflicts and inefficiency."72 According to Allaire, the
federal government had assumed a prominent role in cultural affairs
thanks to national institutions, such as the cEc, the National Research
Council, and the National Gallery. Federal jurisdiction over
communications was also identified as having a significant impact on
Quebec's cultural sector. The Report argued that culture was of central
importance to the development of Quebec's identity, and that it was
"impossible to overestimate the urgent need to repatriate powers in this
area." 73 It concluded that Quebec must have exclusive jurisdiction in all
areas affecting culture and communications.
This recommendation had sweeping implications. As we noted
earlier, it can be argued that virtually all forms of government activity
have a direct and tangible impact on cultural identity. Thus, if Quebec
were to have exclusive power in all areas of jurisdiction affecting culture,
it is difficult to see what would be beyond the powers of the province and
left to the central government. 74
As the federal government prepared its own package of reform
proposals over the summer of 1991, there were widespread fears within
the arts community that Ottawa was planning to devolve cultural
responsibilities to the provinces. These fears were fuelled by discussions
between federal Communications Minister Perrin Beatty and arts
organizations in June 1991. Beatty reportedly asked the arts groups to
suggest which areas of cultural activity the federal government could

711bi at2.
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74 Allaire's proposal on culture is consistent with the remainder of the Report, which
contemplates the federal government being limited to areas such as defence, monetary policy,
equalization, and debt servicing.
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best turn over to the provinces. 75 While Beatty denied that the federal
government would abandon culture, he maintained that the current
division of responsibility was not "immutable," and that there were fields
where cultural funding and other activities could be ceded to the
provinces. As the talk of devolution became more widespread, arts and
cultural associations banded together to form the Common Agenda
Alliance for the Arts, "to express concern over the political focus of the
federal government." 76
The federal government unveiled its package of reform
proposals, Shaping Canada's Future Together: Proposals,77 in late
September. The Federal Proposals included a brief reference to
jurisdiction over culture, noting that it was important to "ensure ... the
maintenance of important Canada-wide institutions that help us
promote our identity." 78 At the same time, the federal government
observed that it was important to permit the provinces to play "the roles
they deem appropriate in the cultural field." 79 This was particularly
critical for the province of Quebec, which has "special responsibilities
80
for the preservation and promotion of Quebec's cultural identity."
Accordingly, the federal government proposed to negotiate cultural
agreements with the provinces that would "define clearly the role of
each level of government." 81 These agreements would recognize the
important "community dimension of culture and the special
responsibilities of the Government of Quebec," 82 but would also provide
for the maintenance of "existing Canadian cultural institutions ... that
83
allow for the expression and dissemination of Canada's identity."
Where appropriate, these agreements would be constitutionalized.
In the related area of broadcasting, the federal government
argued that continued federal regulation was appropriate since activities
in this field cross provincial and international boundaries. However, the

75 See HI. Kirchhoff & V. Ross, "Anxiety spreads over devolution: Change inevitable, Beatty
declares" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (17 August 1991) C1.
76 IbU
77 (Hull: Minister of Supply and Services, 1991) [hereinafter Federal Proposals].
781bidj at 35.
79
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federal government proposed some modest enhancements of the role of
the provinces, such as greater consultation on the issuance of new
4
licences or in nominating regional commissioners for the CRTC.8
The Federal Proposals rejected the Allaire Committee's
recommendation to recognize culture as an area of exclusive provincial
jurisdiction. Rather than entrench a specific cultural power in the
Constitution itself, the federal government proposed the negotiation of
cultural agreements which would then be constitutionalized. A similar
approach had been proposed in the Meech Lake Accord in the field of
immigration. Under this model, federal-provincial agreements would be
constitutionally entrenched in the sense that they would be protected
from unilateral amendment by either level of government. Yet, the
agreements themselves would not be incorporated into the main body of
the Constitution and would be subject to the Charter.85
There is no difficulty in principle with negotiating federalprovincial agreements (on any subject) and then protecting the
agreements from unilateral abrogation or amendment. What matters, of
course, are the terms of any such agreement. In particular, if the federal
government enters into an agreement which unduly limits its powers or
authority, and then binds all future federal governments by
constitutionalizing the agreement, the practical result is a permanent
and unacceptable erosion of federal authority.
It was fear of precisely this kind of scenario which prompted
many arts organizations, particularly those based outside of Quebec, to
react negatively to the Federal Proposals. While the Federal Proposals
did not contain any details as to what the proposed cultural agreements
might contain, there were some broad hints as to the approach that
Ottawa would bring to the negotiating table. The Federal Proposals
made reference to the fact that the federal government would "maintain
responsibility for existing cultural institutions."86 Many arts groups were
concerned about the use of the term "maintain." 87 This seemed to
suggest that the existing national cultural institutions would become the
ceiling for federal involvement in the cultural field, and that the federal
84
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85 See proposed section 95A of the Meech Lake Accord for the elaboration of this approach.
86 Federal Proposals, supra note 77 at 35.
87 See, for example, The Alliance of Canadian Cinema, Television and Radio Artists,
"Enhancing the Federal Role in Culture and Communications" (Submission to the House of
Commons Standing Committee on Culture and Communications, Ottawa, 15 November 1991); and
Ontario Arts Council, "A Strong National Presence in Arts and Culture is a Necessity Declare
Provincial Arts Agencies in Joint Statement" (Toronto: 22 January 1992).
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presence would never exceed, but could certainly fall below, this ceiling.
A focus on merely maintaining existing institutions would mean that
Ottawa would be unable to expand or to adjust its role in light of
changing circumstances.
This interpretation of the Federal Proposals in relation to
culture was entirely plausible, particularly in light of a later reference to
cultural institutions in the discussion of the federal spending power. The
federal spending power refers to the authority of the federal government
to spend or grant money in areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction.
Significantly, in describing the spending power, the Federal Proposals
stated that Canada Council grants to individuals and organizations are
an example of the exercise of this power.88 This is very important for
what it tells us about the federal government's belief as to the basis of its
authority to establish an agency like the Canada Council. What the
federal government is admitting is that national cultural agencies like the
Canada Council are operating in areas of exclusive provincial
jurisdiction.89 Apparently, the only constitutional footing for a national
institution like the Canada Council is the ability of the federal
government to spend money in areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction.
It goes without saying that the spending power is a most
uncertain source of constitutional life-support. The Supreme Court has
recognized the existence of this power in a number of recent
judgments. 90 But the provinces have consistently sought to impose
restrictions on the manner in which the power can be exercised. The
Meech Lake Accord had proposed certain restrictions which would have
applied to the establishment of new, national shared-cost programmes in
areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction. 91 The Federal Proposals in
September 1991 contemplated restrictions similar to those in Meech
Lake which would not have affected existing spending programmes,
including those involving national cultural institutions like the Canada
Council. But who could say what the future would hold? The Federal
Proposals noted that the exercise of the federal spending power had
given rise to "serious and often impassioned debate."92 It was certain
that some provincial governments, particularly Quebec, would continue

88 Supra note 77 at 40.
89 Although the specific provincial jurisdiction is not spelled out, presumably it would be
property and civil rights in s. 92(13).
90
91
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See, for example, ReferenceRe CanadaAssistancePlan (B.C), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 525.
See s. 106A of the Meech Lake Accord.
Supra note 77 at 40.
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to press for wider restrictions on the use of the federal spending power,
such that even existing federal spending might come under provincial
93
scrutiny.
In any event, the assumption that national cultural institutions
operate in areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction would surely play a
major role in the promised negotiations over cultural agreements.
Having acknowledged that national cultural institutions operate in areas
of exclusive provincial jurisdiction, Ottawa had provided the provinces
with the political leverage to limit, or even whittle down, the role of
these agencies. At best, Ottawa might be able to "maintain" its existing
agencies. The idea of creating new institutions, or even of expanding the
mandate of existing ones, would be denounced by the provinces as an
intrusion into their exclusive domain. In support of this argument, the
provinces would be able to rely upon the position articulated by the
federal government in its own Proposals.
By admitting that national cultural institutions were based on the
spending power, Ottawa had indirectly called into question their political
and constitutional legitimacy. As we shall see, this concession by the
federal government was wholly unnecessary. The creation of agencies
like the Canada Council can be justified on a basis which is quite
independent of the federal spending power. For the moment, it is worth
observing that the federal government regarded this basic premise about
the source of its powers as requiring no explanation or elaboration of
any kind. It was apparently self-evident that national cultural agencies
like the Canada Council operated in an area of exclusive provincial
jurisdiction, and that they owed their existence to the frail reed of the
federal spending power.
After the Federal Proposals were released, they were studied by
the House of Commons Standing Committee on Communications and
Culture. The Committee, chaired by Conservative MP Bud Bird, held
three months of public hearings and heard from more than one hundred
witnesses. The Standing Committee also received a background paper
from the Research Branch of the Library of Parliament on the existing
constitutional setting in this field.94 The Background Paper, written by
Mollie Dunsmuir of the Law and Government Division, is illuminating
and important, since it provides a detailed constitutional argument
93

The Charlottetown Accord did, in fact, include wider restrictions on the use of the spending
power. See the proposed amendment to s. 37 of the Constitution Act, 1982, providing for a
framework to govern the use of the spending power.
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See M. Dunsmuir, "Culture and Communications: The Constitutional Setting" (Ottawa:
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which reinforces the assumptions underlying the September 1991
proposals on culture.
The Paper sets out the conventional understanding of the
current constitutional position in relation to culture. Dunsmuir noted
that culture is not specifically referred to in the ConstitutionAc4 1867.
However, after a brief discussion, she concluded, "It seems clear ... that
the provincial legislatures were originally intended to have legislative
jurisdiction over most cultural issues as matters of a merely local or
private nature in the province."9 5 The only exceptions to provincial
jurisdiction were areas where national standards were necessary, such as
copyright (section 91(23)), patents (section 91(22)), naturalization
(section 91(25)), and marriage and divorce (section 91(26)). Dunsmuir
summarized the constitutional division of authority in the following
terms:
In fact, the provincial legislatures do have exclusive legislative jurisdiction over most
cultural matters. On the whole, the federal government's role involves only the spending
power-the ability to fund cultural institutions and programs such as the Canada Council,
the National Film Board and the national museums. It is possible that the federal
government could also justify some legislative control over national cultural institutions
through the use of the "national concern" branch of the Pow power ("peace, order and
good government"), as was done with the National Capital Commission, or by declaring
various works, such as the national museums, to be for the general advantage of Canada.
They have not done so to date, however, and the spending power seems to be the most
relevant issue.9 6

Thus, although Dunsmuir adverted to the possible relevance of
the "national concern" doctrine, she concluded that the role of the
federal government in the cultural domain is mainly dependent on the
spending power. The remainder of the discussion of culture is devoted
to an analysis of the spending power and, in particular, of various
proposals or arguments to the effect that the spending power is an
intrusion into provincial jurisdiction. She concluded that "the only real
alternative to the existing constitutional situation is for restrictions to be
placed on the ability of the federal government to fund cultural
programmes. 97 She presented two alternatives for achieving this goal:
federal-provincial agreements, or "a constitutional amendment
prohibiting or regulating federal spending in areas outside its express
legislative authority."98 Dunsmuir seems to prefer the first option, since
95

1Sbd at 7.
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1bid at 11.
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federal-provincial agreements are simpler and more flexible than a
constitutional amendment, which would have consequences extending
far beyond the cultural field.
The Background Paper illustrates how the choice of starting
points has a habit of determining end points. Having begun with the
premise that the federal role in culture is based on the exercise of the
spending power, Dunsmuir is immediately driven to consider arguments
that this involves an intrusion into provincial jurisdiction. The debate
then devolves into a choice between the different kinds of limits which
might be placed on the ability of the federal government to fund cultural
programmes. Dunsmuir is certainly correct in pointing out that limiting
federal spending through federal-provincial agreement is far preferable
to limits imposed through a formal constitutional amendment. But
where does the need for any such limits arise at all? The answer is
supplied by the initial premise-that the federal role is based on the
exercise of the spending power, as opposed to some other, more robust
source of federal constitutional authority. By questioning or rejecting
this initial premise, we are no longer faced with an unpalatable and
unnecessary choice between different kinds of constraints on federal
authority.
The hearings before the Standing Committee on
Communications and Culture were dominated by various arts
organizations, most of whom called for an affirmation of a strong
national presence in cultural affairs. But when the Standing Committee
came to draft its submission to the Beaudoin-Dobbie Committee and,
later, its report to the House, it proceeded on the basis of the same
assumptions about the limited scope of federal constitutional authority
in this field. The Standing Committee noted that the Constitution is
silent on the issue of jurisdiction over cultureY9 However, the
Committee continued, "it was clear that provinces generally were to
retain control over provincial and local matters," 10o and that this would
include culture. Thus, federal interventions in the field of culture were
based on the power to spend or to establish national institutions:
Specifically, if we consider the constitutional power to legislate in cultural areas such as
dance, music, theatre, sound recording, film or book publishing, it seems clear that the
federal government does not have such legislative powers. However, it does have the
power to spend and to establish national institutions in the fields of culture ...

99 See 7-ws, supra note 53 at 23.
100 Ibid at 26.
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Accordingly, the federal government's cultural initiatives are normally undertaken on the
basis of its non-legislative constitutional powers: its taxing (or expenditure) powers and
101
its power to establish national institutions (such as the cac or The Canada Council).

Thus, the Committee's analysis of the existing constitutional
position is based on the same distinction between legislative and nonlegislative powers (such as the spending power). The Committee
conceded that the federal government does not have legislative powers
in the field of culture, since such powers have been allocated to the
provinces. The federal role is said to be based on its non-legislative
powers such as the power to tax and to spend.
While the Committee accepted this narrow definition of the
scope of federal authority, the overwhelming majority of the witnesses
who appeared before it argued for continued federal leadership in the
cultural field. The Committee's task was thus to square the circle
between the constitutional and the political imperatives-to justify a
wide political role for the federal government on an extremely narrow
constitutional foundation. The Committee responded by proposing the
need for partnerships between all levels of government, and called on
federal, provincial, and municipal governments to negotiate a Canada
CulturalAccord. o2 While the Committee did not specify exactly what
such an Accord would contain, it spoke in general terms of a framework
of national cultural goals and objectives. The CulturalAccord would
have specified how resources would be allocated amongst different
cultural sectors, and how these resources would be delivered through
existing national institutions and federal-provincial funding
arrangements. The CulturalAccordwould reflect a consensus amongst
governments and would be administered by a Council of Ministers for
The Standing Committee also
Cultural Affairs in Canada.
recommended that the CulturalAccordshould not be constitutionalized,
thus rejecting the federal government's approach to cultural agreements
in its Proposals.
Whether a strong federal leadership role would have been
maintained within the framework proposed by the Committee is
certainly open to some question. The Committee's CulturalAccord
would have been administered by a Council of Ministers in which the
federal government would have been badly outnumbered by the
provinces. But debating the merits of the Committee's proposal is, for
our purposes at least, beside the point. It is important to note, yet again,
101

IN& at 26 (emphasis in original).

102 Ibid. c. 2.
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how the choice of starting points has a tendency to determine end
points. Once it is assumed that the federal government lacks legislative
power over culture, it becomes extremely difficult to justify a leading
political role for the national government in this field. The idea of a
CulturalAccordwith the provinces and municipalities seemed the most
attractive way of guaranteeing a strong federal presence within a most
unattractive constitutional framework.
At the same time as the Standing Committee on
Communications and Culture was considering the cultural aspects of the
Federal Proposals, the Beaudoin-Dobbie Committee was reporting on
the Proposals as a whole. The Beaudoin-Dobbie Report, dated 28
February 1992, made a number of specific recommendations with
respect to culture. 10 3 Essentially, the Committee recommended an
asymmetrical approach, in which special cultural powers for Quebec
would be explicitly recognized in the Constitution.1 0 4 The Committee
left open the possibility that other provinces may be interested in the
future in having their legislative jurisdiction over cultural affairs
"affirmed" in the Constitution. The Committee used the term
"affirmed" since it was of the view that "under the Constitution, the
provinces have the primary legislative role with respect to general
cultural matters." 105 While noting that culture is not an enumerated
head of power, the Committee stated that "cultural activities have a
direct relationship to provincial jurisdiction over education, property
and civil rights, and matters of a local or private nature in the
province." 1 6 Thus, entrenching a provincial role in relation to culture
would merely be making explicit what is already implicit.
In addition to proposing that Quebec's legislative authority over
cultural affairs be affirmed, the Beaudoin-Dobbie Committee
recommended a Canada-Quebec cultural agreement which would clearly
define the role of each government in the cultural field. While the
Committee spoke in terms of such an agreement clarifying
responsibilities, on closer examination, it appeared that the main

103 Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons, A Renewed Canada
(Co-chairs: Hon. G. Beaudoin & D. Dobbie) (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 28 February
1992) at 75-80 [hereinafter Beaudoin-Dobbie Committee].
104 The Committee, at 118, recommended the enactment of a new section (93B) which would
have provided as follows:
93B: The authority of the Legislature of Quebec exclusively to make laws in relation to
cultural matters in Quebec is hereby affirmed.
105
1 INd at 76.
106

/bIN at 76-77.
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objective was to limit federal spending on culture. The Committee
stated that the Canada-Quebec cultural agreement would "identify areas
where direct payments to individuals and private cultural organizations
would be the exclusive responsibility of the province." 10 7 Under the
agreement, Quebec would receive its share of federal spending
programmes on culture to be spent in accordance with the priorities
established by the province. In addition, any further use of the federal
spending power to fund cultural activities in Quebec would require the
approval of the Quebec government, subject to federal programmes
meeting "fundamental national objectives." 108 While this latter term
was not defined, the Committee identified international or
interprovincial cultural exchanges as one programme which was "clearly
identified as related to national objectives." 109
The Beaudoin-Dobbie Committee observed that there was
strong political support for continued national funding of the arts, since
such funding is "essential for national unity and the survival of Canada
as a nation."110 Yet the Committee's proposals in relation to culture
seemed to adopt a devolutionist logic which would inevitably lead to a
reduced federal presence in the cultural sector across the country. The
constitutional recognition of Quebec's exclusive authority over cultural
affairs, while presented as a mere codification of the status quo, would
have significantly reduced the federal presence in the province of
Quebec. Further, the Committee held open the possibility that the same
approach might be applied to the other provinces in the future. While
the other provinces were not pressing for increased authority over
culture, it would surely have been only a matter of time before such
demands would be forthcoming. Under the Beaudoin-Dobbie approach,
the Quebec government would receive its share of federal spending on
culture programmes and dispose of the funds in accordance with
priorities established by the province. The political attractiveness of this
arrangement was overwhelming and utterly irresistible-the federal
government would levy taxes and then immediately turn the funds over
to the province to determine how they should be spent. Once such an
arrangement was in place for Quebec, the other provinces could not be
expected to wait too long for similar treatment. The beauty of it, from
the provinces' point of view, was that their demands on the federal purse
1 07

bi& at 79.

108 bia
1 09
11 0

INb
b& at 77, quoting the Prince Edward Island Council of the Arts.
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could be justified on the basis of high constitutional principle, rather
than as a grubby attempt to get their hands on more money.
As it turned out, the devolutionist logic implicit in BeaudoinDobbie did not take very long to manifest itself. In mid-March 1992, the
federal, provincial, and territorial governments, along with the four
national Aboriginal organizations, began the Multilateral Meetings on
the Constitution.111 The government of Quebec boycotted the first stage
of these talks, which produced a tentative agreement involving all the
other governments and the Aboriginal organizations on 7 July.112
Quebec then joined the talks for the second stage, which resulted in the
Charlottetown Accord of 28 August.11 3
In terms of the division of powers between the federal
government and the provinces, the Charlottetown Accord tended to
favour arrangements which placed all provinces on an equal footing.
The vast majority of the constitutional amendments proposed would not
have recognized any special powers or authority for the province of
Quebec. In terms of authority over culture, the Charlottetown Accord
used the Beaudoin-Dobbie proposals as a base, but generalized from this
base so as to grant all provinces the additional recognition which
Beaudoin-Dobbie had proposed for Quebec alone. Thus, whereas
Beaudoin-Dobbie had proposed that Quebec should have its legislative
jurisdiction over culture affirmed, the Charlottetown Accord proposed
that this affirmation should apply to all provinces. Similarly, the
Beaudoin-Dobbie proposal to negotiate a Canada-Quebec cultural
agreement was transformed into a constitutional amendment requiring
the federal government to negotiate cultural agreements with all the
provinces.
In defending the Charlottetown proposals, the federal
government argued that it was not losing any of its existing powers in the
cultural sphere. According to Communications Minister Perrin Beatty,
the recognition of provincial legislative responsibility over culture
"merely facilitate[s] the ability of the provinces to act in this area."11 4
According to Beatty, Ottawa would not be abandoning any of its existing
powers, nor would it be shutting down federal institutions like the cBc or

I1I For an analysis of the multilateral process, see P. Monahan, "The Sounds of Silence," in
McRoberts & Monahan, supra note 1.
112
See "Status Report: The Multilateral Meetings on the Constitution," 16 July 1992.
113

See "Consensus Report on the Constitution: Charlottetown," 29 August 1992.
See J. Portman, "Ottawa to keep firm grasp on arts: New accord no threat to the cnc or
film board, minister says" The Toronto Star (28 August 1992) A14.
114
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the Canada Council. Beatty's reassuring interpretation of the Accord
was based on proposed section 92B(2), which stated that "[t]he
Government of Canada retains its role in relation to national cultural
matters, including national cultural institutions and grants and
contributions delivered by such institutions."
In the next section of the paper, when we consider the scope of
the federal government's existing cultural authority, it will become
apparent that this interpretation of the Charlottetown Accord's cultural
provisions was rather misleading. For now, it is sufficient to offer a
number of preliminary observations about the cultural provisions in the
Charlottetown Accord.
First, the proposed amendments are based on the same
assumptions about the broad character of provincial powers (and the
narrow scope of federal powers) that we have already encountered. The
baseline assumption is that the provinces have legislative authority over
cultural matters, with the federal role being limited to the exercise of the
spending power. This is made plain by the important differences
between subsections (1) and (2) of proposed section 92B.115 Subsection
(1) describes provincial authority in expansive terms. According to
subsection (1), provincial legislatures may "exclusively make laws in
relation to culture in the province." This language, and particularly the
use of the term "exclusively" to describe provincial authority, tracks the
language of section 92 as a whole. Moreover, 92B(1) makes no
reference to "affirming" legislative authority, language that is used
elsewhere in the Accord.1 16 The use of the term "affirmed" in
describing legislative authority tends to suggest that there is no new
grant of power, but merely an affirmation of power that is conferred
elsewherej 17 The absence of this language in subsection (1) leaves open
the possibility that a new source of provincial authority is being
recognized.
The differences in the terminology used to describe federal
authority in subsections (2) and (3) of 92B are quite striking.
Subsections (2) and (3) of proposed 92B provided as follows:

1 15

See text of proposed section 92B supra note 67.

116 For example, section 93A states that "it is hereby affirmed" that certain matters "come
within the exclusive legislative authority of the legislature of the province;" the same "affirming"
language is used elsewhere, in describing the role of Quebec to preserve and promote the distinct
society of Quebec.
1 17
See P.W. Hogg, Meech Lake Constituional.AccordAnnotated(Toronto: Carswell, 1988) at
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(2) The Government of Canada retains its role in relation to
national cultural matters, including national cultural institutions
and grants and contributions delivered by such institutions.
(3) Nothing in subsection (2) extends the authority of the Parliament
of Canada.
Whereas subsection (1) had referred to the exclusive authority of
the provincial legislatures, subsection (2) refers only to the government
(but not the Parliament) of Canada. The omission of any reference to
Parliament in subsection (2) is not due to mere oversight, since
Parliament is explicitly referenced in subsection (3), where it is stated
that subsection (2) does not extend Parliament's powers. By referring to
the Canadian government-but not to Parliament-the implication is
that federal authority over culture is limited to the exercise of the federal
spending power in areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction. In effect,
the deliberate omission of any reference to Parliament suggests that
there is no federal law-making authority in relation to culture. This
interpretation of subsection (2) is reinforced by the reference to the
federal role as including "national cultural institutions and grants and
contributions delivered by such institutions." The making of grants and
contributions, or the establishment of cultural institutions, are the very
examples which were utilized by the Beaudoin-Dobbie Committee in
describing the limited ambit of federal authority in the culture field.
The other significant feature of subsections (2) and (3) is that
they were worded in such a way as to negate any inference that any new
authority was being recognized or created. Subsection (2) stated that
the federal government "retains its role" in relation to national cultural
matters. The clear implication of the word "retain" was that subsection
(2) did not itself grant any authority, but merely confirmed authority
which was created elsewhere. The use of the word "role" to describe
federal authority is also significant. Other provisions in the Constitution
Act, 1867 which create or grant legislative power employ terminology
such as "may make laws in relation to matters."118 This same powergranting terminology is used to describe the provincial authority in
relation to cultural matters in subsection (1). The use of the term "role"
to describe federal authority in cultural matters contrasts sharply with
this power-granting terminology found elsewhere. It reinforces the view
that what is intended is merely to confirm the existence of federal
authority, rather than to create any new authority.
118

See, for example, the opening words of s. 91, which provide that Parliament may "make
Laws for the Peace, Order and Good Government of Canada, in relation to all Matters not coming
within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces."
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In short, what section 92B of the Charlottetown Accord does is
to codify the interpretation of federal and provincial cultural powers
which had been widely accepted throughout the Canada Round.
According to this prevailing wisdom, the provincial legislatures possess
primary legislative authority in relation to cultural matters. The role of
the federal government is limited to the exercise of the federal spending
power in areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction. The Parliament of
Canada does not possess any legislative power in relation to cultural
matters, since such authority is reserved to the provincial legislatures.
We have already seen how these assumptions about the nature
and extent of federal authority over cultural matters carry a number of
important implications. In particular, accepting the idea that the federal
cultural role is based primarily on the exercise of the spending power
leads immediately to proposals to limit or to constrain the way in which
that power is exercised. This is because the provinces in general, and
Quebec in particular, have traditionally regarded the use of the federal
spending power as an intrusion into their exclusive domain.
This selfsame dynamic is reflected directly in the Charlottetown
Accord. Having recognized in section 92B that the provinces have
exclusive authority to make laws in relation to culture, section 92C
provides that the federal government shall negotiate cultural agreements
with provinces "for the purpose of ensuring that both governments work
in harmony, recognizing the lead responsibility of the province for
culture in the province." Section 92C appears to establish a significant
new constraint on the exercise of the federal spending power in the
cultural field. Although the reference to agreements on culture suggests
that any limits on federal spending powers will only arise sometime in
the future, the obligation to conclude such agreements is mandatory and
immediate. Section 92C stated that the government of Canada "shall
negotiate ...
an agreement on culture." This mandatory language can be

contrasted with provisions in other parts of the Accord, which provided
for the negotiation of agreements, where more flexible wording is
employed, such as, "shall negotiate for the purpose of concluding an
agreement." 119 Further, 92B makes it clear that, whatever else the
agreements on culture might contain, they must recognize the lead
responsibility of the province for culture in the province. If any future
federal government were to question or reject the lead role of the
provinces, it would be open to a province to enforce its primacy through
court proceedings. The precise meaning of the term "lead responsibility
119 See, for example, the obligation to negotiate in sections 93A (six policy fields) or 93B
(labour market development and training).
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of the province" is not defined. But presumably this would mean that
some significant portion of the monies which the federal government is
now spending on culture in the province must be handed over to the
provinces. This was precisely what Beaudoin-Dobbie proposed in terms
of the federal cultural role in Quebec. This is also the approach that is
contemplated in other sections of the Accord which provided for the
negotiation of federal-provincial agreements.1 20
The federal government maintained that sections 92B and 92C
would "provide a firm constitutional basis for federal institutions and
programs ... [and] allow all governments to support cultural
initiatives." 121 It is true that the Accord does make some reference to a
federal role in relation to culture and that, in this sense, it recognizes a
"constitutional basis" for federal action in this field. But the question
which must be asked is the nature of the federal role contemplated by
these provisions. In fact, the Accord assumes that federal authority over
culture is limited and circumscribed. It is the provinces which are said to
possess lead responsibility over culture in the province.
The federal government was prepared to recognize the primacy
of the provinces in this area on the basis that this merely entrenched the
constitutional status quo. In one sense, it is hardly surprising that the
federal government approached the matter on this basis. All of the
studies and reports which had been published in the months leading up
to the negotiation of the Accord concluded that the provinces had
primary legislative authority in relation to cultural matters, and that the
federal role was limited to the exercise of the federal spending power.
But the problem was simply this: suppose all these studies and reports
had got it wrong? Suppose the scope of federal authority over cultural
matters was in fact far broader than had been assumed throughout the
discussions leading to the Charlottetown Accord? If that were the case,
then the apparently innocuous sections 92B and 92C would in fact
represent a significant and unwarranted erosion of federal authority.

120

See, for example, section 93A, which provides that the federal government shall negotiate
agreements in six policy fields "under which the Government of Canada is required to withdraw
partially or completely as soon as is practicable from any program of grants or contributions ... and
is required to provide reasonable compensation to the province or territory."
121 See letter of Hon. Joe Clark, Minister of Constitutional Affairs to Ms. Penny Dickens,
Common Agenda Alliance for the Arts (15 July 1993) [on file with author].
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IV. TOWARDS A NEW UNDERSTANDING: FEDERAL
CULTURAL POLICY AND THE PEACE, ORDER AND
GOOD GOVERNMENT POWER
In this section, I suggest that jurisdiction over cultural matters is
divided in a way that is quite different from that which was assumed
during the Canada Round discussions. Contrary to the Canada Round
view, I suggest that it is inaccurate to describe the provinces as having
primary jurisdiction over cultural matters. Rather, culture is an area of
shared jurisdiction in which both levels of government have a legitimate
and important role to play. The federal government, in particular, has a
significant responsibility in this regard. Only the federal government is
in a position to promote a distinct national identity and a sense of
common values amongst all Canadians. The promotion of this national
identity and these common values is a matter of continuing importance
and, arguably, even urgency, given such factors as our cultural
heterogeneity, our dispersal across a vast territory, and our proximity to
the United States. The need to protect and promote a distinctive
Canadian identity in the face of these challenges furnishes a firm
constitutional basis for national policy-making in the cultural sphere.
What this means is that the widely accepted theory that federal
jurisdiction over cultural matters is primarily dependent upon the
spending power is simply wrong. The spending power theory proceeds
on the assumption that culture is an area primarily reserved to the
provinces, and that the federal government is able to act in this area only
by virtue of its power to raise and spend tax revenues. But once it is
recognized that culture is an area of shared jurisdiction, with both levels
of government playing valid and legitimate roles, federal cultural
initiatives can be viewed in a totally different constitutional light. Rather
than being an intrusion into an area of exclusive provincial jurisdiction,
federal cultural policy can be seen as a response to the need to promote
a distinct national identity. This is a challenge which is inherently
national in scope and therefore necessarily beyond the responsibility of
the provinces, either individually or collectively.
These general conclusions can be unpacked and broken down
into a number of discrete propositions. These propositions, beginning
with the most general and proceeding to the more specific, are as
follows:
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1. Under the existing constitution, neither level of government is
allocated exclusive jurisdiction over culture. Indeed, allocating
exclusive jurisdictionover culture to a particularlevel of government
appearsto be inconsistentwith a federal division ofpowers.
We have already noted the all-encompassing nature of the
concept of culture. Culture can be described as all the social, political,
economic, and artistic elements that together constitute and define a
society's "collective way of being."122 As such, virtually all government
action affects, in some fashion or another, a society's cultural make-up.
A number of important conclusions follow from this observation.
The first is that it is simply inappropriate within a federal state to
allocate exclusive jurisdiction over cultural matters to a single level of
government. To do so would be to violate two basic norms associated
with a federal state. The first such norm is the idea that jurisdiction
within a federal state is divided between different orders of government.
The second is that each order of government within a federal context
exercises authority that is limited or circumscribed by the authority of
the other orders.
Because culture is such an all-encompassing concept, granting a
single order of government exclusive authority over cultural matters
appears to be inconsistent with both of these norms. Such a grant of
power would violate the principle that jurisdiction should be divided,
since a single order of government would effectively have authority over
the whole range of policy fields. And it also would violate the principle
that authority in a federal state should be limited or circumscribed, since
a government that had exclusive authority over culture would effectively
have unlimited authority, and would be in a position to negate or to
frustrate the autonomy of the other levels of government.
The contradiction between basic federal principles and allocating
jurisdiction over culture to a single level of government was apparently
overlooked during the recent Canada Round of constitutional
negotiations. As we have seen, the Charlottetown Accord would have
recognized the exclusive authority of the provincial legislatures to make
laws in relation to culture in the province. But if we look back beyond
the Charlottetown debate, we discover that it was at one time regarded
as virtually axiomatic that it would be inappropriate to allocate exclusive
jurisdiction over culture to a particular level of government. This is
precisely the point made by Professor Gil R6millard in a 1974 article in

122 For discussion, see above text accompanying note 13.
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Le Devoir.123 Noting that the issue of jurisdiction over culture had often
been a source of constitutional conflict, Professor R6millard (as he then
was) 124 explained that it is absurd to think that culture could be an
exclusively provincial responsibility within a federal state.125 The reason,
according to Professor Rmillard, was that a federation was not merely a
union of provinces, but of individuals. Accordingly, the federal or
national government has a legitimate role to play in promoting a sense
of national identity amongst all the citizens of the federation. The
promotion of national identity was a matter of distinct national concern
and, as such, falls under a recognized source of federal authority under
section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867.126 Rmillard noted that the
provinces also enjoyed authority to promote cultural development within
the province. Accordingly, he concluded that culture must necessarily be
127
an area of shared or concurrent jurisdiction within a federal state.
Other jurists and commentators writing in the 1970s came to
similar conclusions with regard to jurisdiction over culture. Of particular
significance was an important article by Professor W.R. Lederman
published in the CanadianBar Review in 1975.128 In this now classic
article, Lederman propounded a theory of the "spirit and philosophy of
our Canadian system for the division of legislative powers." 129 This
spirit and philosophy, which Lederman traced through numerous court
decisions, was based on the idea that governments should be granted
jurisdiction over limited and discrete subject areas. In Lederman's view,
there was a need "to keep the power-conferring phrases of our federalprovincial division of powers at meaningful levels of specifics and
particulars."130 Very general or all-encompassing categories were
123 "Impossible en r6gime f6d6ral de r6server la culture aux seuls Ptats provinciaux" Le
Devoir (11 mars 1974) 5 [hereinafter "Impossible en r6gime f6d6ral"].
124 Professor Rdmillard became Quebec's Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs in December
1985 after the election of Robert Bourassa's liberals. He played a key role in both the Meech Lake
and Charlottetown Accord negotiations.
125 "Impossible en regime fd6ral",supra note 123.
126 Professor R6millard recited the cases in which this national concern or national
dimensions doctrine had been accepted by the Privy Council and the Supreme Court of Canada,
including Munro v.National CapitalCommisrion, [1966] S.C.R. 663 [hereinafter Munro].
127 For a similar analysis and conclusion, see G. R6millard, "La comptence legislative des
provinces sur le commerce des productions cin6matographiques" (1979) 39 R. du B. 91.
128 "Unity and Diversity in Canadian Federalism: Ideals and Methods of Moderation" (1975)
53 Can. Bar Rev. 597.
129 biaW at 611.
130 N1
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inappropriate as a basis for allocating jurisdiction, since they would grant
sweeping powers to a single level of government and could "lead to
constitutional chaos or to the end of federalism." 131 Lederman offered a
number of examples of the kinds of sweeping categories which he
regarded as inappropriate as a basis for dividing jurisdiction in a federal
state. One such category was culture. Lederman noted that today
"everything is cultural," including literature, automobiles, tools,
computers, home comforts, lifestyle, and the Boeing 747V32 Lederman
concluded that if culture were recognized as an area of exclusive
jurisdiction of either the provinces or the federal government, it would
effectively spell the end of the division of powers. Lederman suggested
that all-pervasive categories such as culture 33 "cannot be allowed to
dominate our distribution-of-powers system from within." Instead, these
general categories should be regarded as "outside the system ... [and]
subdivided into appropriate parts so that necessary legislative action can
be taken by some combination of both federal and provincial
statutes." 34
Lederman's theory of the spirit and philosophy of Canadian
federalism was soon embraced by the Supreme Court of Canada. In the
Reference Re Anti-Inflation, 35 Mr. Justice Beetz cited the Lederman
analysis in holding that "inflation" was too diffuse a subject-matter to
serve as a basis for federal legislative jurisdiction. Although Mr. Justice
Beetz dissented in the result in the Anti-InflationReference, his reasoning
on this particular point was endorsed by a majority of the Court. The
Beetz-Lederman analysis has since been accepted and applied by the
Supreme Court of Canada in a number of subsequent cases, most
notably in the recent decision in the Friends of Oldman River Society v.
Canada (Ministerof Transport).13 6 In this case, it was argued that the
provinces had exclusive jurisdiction over certain aspects of "the
environment," and that a federal environmental assessment scheme was
therefore ultra vires or inapplicable to provincial projects. Mr. Justice La
Forest rejected this argument, noting that the environment was an
inappropriate basis for dividing legislative jurisdiction. The reason,
13

1 Ibid at 615.

132

bid, quoting from an article by G. Cormier published in La Presse (9 November 1973).

133

'The other categories mentioned by Lederman as being an inappropriate basis for dividing
jurisdiction were environmental pollution, economic growth, quality of life, and language.
134

bid at 616.

135 [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373 (hereinafterAnti-InflationReference).
136 [1992] 1 S.CR. 3 [hereinafter Oldran River].
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according to La Forest J., was that the environment was an amorphous
and all-encompassing category that lacked the necessary definition to
serve as a constitutional category under section 91 or 92 of the
ConstitutionAc4 1867. The environment "could never be treated as a
constitutional unit under one order of government in any Constitution
that claimed to be federal, because no system in which one government
was so powerful would be federal. 1 3 7 Accordingly, the environment was
not an independent matter of legislation under the Constitution, rather
it was an aggregate of matters. For constitutional purposes, this meant
that either level of government could pass laws with environmental
purposes or effects. In the result, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld
the right of the federal government to apply the environmental
guidelines to the Oldman River dam project, while recognizing that the
project was also subject to provincial regulation.
Mr. Justice La Forest did not discuss the issue of culture, since it
did not arise in the circumstances of the Oldman River case. However,
his analysis relating to jurisdiction over the environment would apply
with equal force to the issue of culture. The concept of culture is just as
amorphous and all-encompassing as that of the environment. The point
is simply that granting a single level of government exclusive authority
over categories such as culture, the environment, or inflation has been
consistently rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada on the basis that
it contradicts the very idea of a federal division of powers. Thus, the
omission of culture from the list of categories in sections 91 and 92 of
the ConstitutionAc4 1867 is not due to mere happenstance, but rather is
a reflection of the desire to keep the constitutional categories in the Act
within manageable proportions.
2. Since culture is not a matter that is reserved exclusively to either
level of government, both the federal and provincialgovernments
are free to enact laws with cultural impact. Culture is properly
understoodas a matter of concurrent or sharedjurisdiction,rather
than as being subject to the primary authority of either level of
government.
The fact that culture is not a recognized constitutional category
has the practical effect of leaving the field open to either level of
government. Even though a federal or provincial law might relate to
culture, it will be valid as long as any such law is authorized by particular
sources of authority found in the Constitution. It would be pointless to
try to list or to identify these "culturally significant" laws because, as we
137 Ibid. at 63-64, quoting D. Gibson, "Constitutional Jurisdiction over Environmental
Management in Canada" (1973) 23 U.T.LJ. 54 at 85.
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have noted, virtually all types of laws have cultural impact. Nevertheless,
offering a few examples tends to illustrate the point that the concept of
culture is virtually co-extensive with the law-making function itself.
Some of the most obvious examples of federal laws which are culturally
significant range from the federal CitizenshipAct 38 (defining who is a
citizen), the equalization programme (providing for access to reasonably
comparable levels of public services), the legislation privatizing Air
Canada, the Official LanguagesAct 139 the BroadcastingAct,140 and the
annual federal budget.
These examples reinforce the inappropriateness of describing
culture as a matter that is primarily under provincial jurisdiction. It is
certainly true that the provinces have ample authority to legislate in ways
that affect culture within their jurisdictions. Provincial education laws
are the most obvious example. But to suggest that culture is somehow a
matter that is primarily reserved to the provinces ignores the equally
wide scope for federal intervention in this field. It also introduces a
concept of "primary" versus "secondary" fields of jurisdiction, something
that is unknown in Canadian constitutional law. The long-established
approach of the courts to division-of-powers analysis is to focus on the
particulars of individual statutes, rather than on fields of jurisdiction.
The courts identify the pith and substance or main purpose of a statute
and ask whether there is authority to enact that particular law. Under
this approach, extensive functional concurrency is the norm, since
federal and provincial laws dealing with similar fields of jurisdiction may
nevertheless be held to be valid under the pith and substance
doctrine.1 4 The point is that the suggestion that a particular level of
government enjoys primary authority in a field of jurisdiction simply fails
to account for the manner in which the courts actually approach
division-of-powers questions.
3. In addition to its generalability to enact laws with culturalimpac4
the federal government has a particularrole and responsibility to
promote a distinct Canadianidentity. This is a matter of distinct
national concern andpermits the federalgovernment to undertake
the regulation and support of the arts and cultural industries in
Canada.

138 S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 108.
139

R.C. 1985, c.0-2.

1 40

R.S.C. 1985, c. B-11.

1 41

For a lucid discussion of the "pith and substance" doctrine, see Hogg, supra note 64 at 377-
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I have already referred extensively to the particular challenges
facing the development of a distinctive Canadian identity. Ever since
the Massey Commission in 1951, it has been widely accepted that the
national government has a crucial role to play in responding to these
challenges. What remains is to elaborate the constitutional significance
of these circumstances. My view is that the promotion of a distinct
national identity constitutes a matter of distinct national concern in
Canada, and that this, therefore, qualifies as a matter falling within the
"Peace, Order and Good Government" (POGG) power of the federal
Parliament.
The POGG power refers to the residual authority of the federal
Parliament to enact laws in relation to matters falling outside of
provincial jurisdiction.14 2 One aspect of this POGG power relates to
matters of national concern, as defined by Viscount Simon in Canada
143
TemperanceFederation:
The true test must be found in the real subject-matter of the legislation: if it is such that it
goes beyond local or provincial concern or interests and must, from its inherent nature,
be the concern of the Dominion as a whole [as, for example, in the Aeronauticscase and
the Radio case], then it will fall within the competence of the Dominion Parliament as a
matter affecting the peace, order and good government of Canada, though it may in
another aspect touch on matters specially reserved to the Provincial Legislatures. 144

What the Temperance Federation case establishes, therefore, is
that matters which must "from [their] inherent nature be the concern of
the Dominion as a whole" fall under the federal Parliament's Poc
power. But what criteria or indicia enable us to identify such inherently
national matters? The answer has been somewhat obscure, despite
numerous recent attempts by the courts and academic commentators to
clarify the relevant considerations. According to the most recent
pronouncements of the Supreme Court of Canada, it is relevant to
consider a so-called "provincial inability" test. According to this test, it
is important to assess the effect on extra-provincial interests of a
provincial failure to deal effectively with harm caused by a particular
activity.14 5 Where the failure of one province to act would injure the

142

See the opening words of section 91 of the ConstitutionAc, 1867. One of the clearest
expositions of the meaning of this clause is found in K. Lysyk, "Constitutional Reform and the
Introductory Clause of Section 91: Residual and Emergency Law-Making Authority" (1979) 57 Can.
Bar Rev. 531.
143 [1946] A.C. 193 [hereinafter Temperance Federation].
144]bi. at 205.
145

See R.v. Crown Zellerbach CanadaLtd., [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401.
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residents of other provinces, the matter is beyond the capacity of the
provinces and must be regulated nationally.146
However, although this provincial inability test has been
endorsed by the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court has not suggested
that this is the only or even the primary basis for determining whether a
matter is of inherent national concern. Other judgments of the Court in
which the national concern doctrine has been applied suggest that a
matter may fall under federal jurisdiction even though there may not be
an identifiable harm flowing from the absence of provincial regulation.
Two prime examples of such cases are Munro,147 decided in 1966,
and Reference Re Offshore MineralRights (BritishColumbia),148 decided a
year later. In Munro, at issue was the National CapitalAct,149 federal
legislation which created a National Capital Commission with zoning
and expropriation powers in the Ottawa-Hull region. Zoning and
expropriation powers are traditionally matters regarded as falling within
provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights. Thus, it was argued
that the federal legislation was ultra vires since it purported to confer
these powers on a federal agency; but the Supreme Court rejected this
argument. In upholding the Act, the Court placed particular emphasis
on the purposes underlying the creation of the national capital region.
According to section 10 of the NationalCapitalAct, the purpose of the
national capital commission was to ensure that the "nature and
character of the seat of the Government of Canada may be in
accordance with its national significance." The Court asked whether this
was a matter which could possibly fall under provincial jurisdiction under
section 92 of the ConstitutionAc 1867. The answer, according to the
Court, was virtually self-evident: only the national government could
possibly undertake responsibility for ensuring that the capital region was
developed "in accordance with its national significance." The provinces,
either individually or collectively, could not possibly undertake this
national responsibility, since provinces are necessarily limited to
provincial concerns and interests. "I find it difficult," wrote Mr. Justice
Cartwright,
to suggest a subject matter of legislation which more clearly goes beyond local or
provincial interests and is the concern of Canada as a whole than the development,
conservation and improvement of the National Capital Region in accordance with a

146 See, in particular, the discussion by Hogg, supra note 64 at 446.48.
14 7

Supra note 126.
148 [19671 S.C.R. 792 [hereinafter Offshore Mineral].
149

R1S.C. 1985, c. N-3.

1993]

Culture and the CanadianConstitution
coherent plan in order that the nature and character of the seat of the Government of
Canada may be in accordance with its national significance. 150

A similar analysis was applied in the Offshore Mineralcase. Here
the issue was the ownership and control of the minerals in the seabed
under Canadian waters off the British Columbia coast. In holding in
favour of the federal government, the Supreme Court emphasized the
fact that the territorial sea off the B.C. coast had never been part of the
colony of British Columbia before it joined Confederation. Nor had
British Columbia acquired ownership of the territorial sea in the period
after 1871. The Supreme Court concluded that the territorial sea fell
outside of the boundaries of any particular province. Ownership rights
must, therefore, be accorded to Canada, which had become a sovereign
state under international law in the early twentieth century and
succeeded to rights previously held by Great Britain. In the words of the
Supreme Court, "[t]he mineral resources of the lands underlying the
territorial sea are of concern to Canada as a whole and go beyond
provincial concern or interests."1 51
The basic approach adopted by the Court in these two cases
consists of a two-part test. The Court first examines the purpose or
subject-matter of a particular statute and asks whether this purpose or
subject-matter falls within the catalogue of provincial powers. In both
these cases, the Court finds that the statutes in question deal with
matters which could not possibly fall under provincial jurisdiction. In
Munro, this is because the purpose of the legislation is necessarily
national in scope; in the Offshore Mineral case, the land in question fell
outside of provincial boundaries and thus could not be regulated
provincially. Having found in both instances that the matters in question
fall outside of the categories in section 92, the Court moves on to the
second part of the test. At this stage, the Court looks at the nature of
the matter before it to determine whether it is of national scope or
significance. In both instances, the answer to this second question
affirmative. In Munro, we were dealing with the seat of the national
government; in Offshore Mineral,with ownership over resources that did
not belong to any particular province. This leads the Court in both cases
to conclude that these matters must necessarily fall under the federal
residual Po_ power as matters of inherent national concern.
In doctrinal terms, it is important to note that the Court's
conclusion does not depend on any argument about provincial inability
150

Munro,supranote 126 at 671.
151 Offshore Mineral,supra note 148 at 817.
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or the harm that would flow from a lack of provincial cooperation. In
the Munro case, the issue was the ability of the federal government to
create a National Capital Commission with effective powers; but the
justification for creating the commission was not the avoidance of harm
that would flow from lack of provincial cooperation. Provincial
cooperation, or lack of it, was beside the point. Only the national
government could ensure the development of the capital region in
accordance with its national significance. Therefore, the legislation
establishing the Commission must necessarily be enacted by the national
government. Similarly, in the Offshore Mineral case, there was no
question of any harm which might have resulted from the absence of
federal regulation. The rationale was simply that the lands in question
were beyond provincial boundaries and thus must necessarily fall under
federal ownership and control.
How is this discussion relevant to federal legislation in the fields
of the arts and cultural industries? In my view, the same line of
reasoning advanced in Munro and the Offshore Mineral cases can be
applied to federal legislation regulating and supporting the arts and
cultural industries. In effect, federal legislation in this area deals with a
matter of inherent national concern and is therefore within the residual
authority of the Parliament of Canada as part of its POG power.
Federal support for the arts and cultural industries has been
prompted by the belief that promoting a distinct Canadian national
identity depends upon active state intervention. As the Massey
Commission demonstrated so convincingly in 1951, leaving Canadian
culture to the vagaries of the market would effectively mean the end of
an indigenous Canadian cultural industry. This basic reality has been
recognized by all political parties across the political spectrum in
Canada; notice that the Conservative government under Prime Minister
Brian Mulroney, often criticized for its embrace of market principles in
many other areas of policy, specifically sought and obtained an
exemption for cultural industries in the 1988 Free TradeAgreement. Of
course, programmes of support for cultural industries are certainly not
unique to Canada. As we have already observed, it is commonplace in
all modern industrialized states to undertake such programmes, in an
effort to promote or reinforce common values and national identity152
The magnitude of programmes to defend a nation's cultural heritage will
vary, depending on "whether the country has a strong national tradition

152 See, generally, Cummings & Katz, supra note 22.
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to defend or still feels the need to develop its own cultural identity."15 3
In the Canadian case, the imperatives mandating a national cultural
policy are particularly pressing, because of the overwhelming cultural
influence of the United States. Cultural policy has been a particular
feature of the federal government's mandate since at least the early
1960s.
Thus, there seems little question that a programme of support to
the arts and the cultural industries is legitimate and even necessary in
Canada. The next question which arises is whether this kind of
programme is a matter which falls under legitimate federal jurisdiction
under the Constitution. It is here that the Supreme Court's analysis in
Munro and the Offshore Mineral case becomes particularly relevant and
useful. Any programme designed to promote a distinct national identity
and common Canadian values could not possibly be a matter of concern
to the provinces. Such purposes are necessarily those of the national
government, since only the national government is elected by and
accountable to Canadians in all parts of the country. In this sense,
programmes of support to the cultural industries satisfy both parts of the
two-part test developed by the Supreme Court in Munro and Offshore
Mineral. Programmes of support for the cultural industries, since they
are designed to promote national values and a national identity, could
not possibly fall within any of the categories in section 92 of the
ConstitutionAc4 1867, because all such matters are necessarily limited by
the description "matters within the province." By the same token, such
programmes are of inherent national concern since they are designed to
promote common values and national identity. In effect, they deal with
Canadians as citizens of the country as a whole, rather than as residents
of any particular province.
This constitutional rationale would apply across the whole range
of federal programmes in relation to cultural industries. It would
include all the different programmes and regulatory instruments
employed by the federal government in this sector, including direct
spending, grants and contributions, taxation, regulation, services, and
ownership! 5 4 To the extent that these programmes further the goal of
153

ibid at 9-10.

154 See Government Expenditures, supra note 53 at 12, for a detailed description of the
different ways in which government intervenes in the cultural sector. Statistics Canada defines the
cultural activity of the federal government as falling into the following categories: (1) cultural
industries: broadcasting, film and video, book and periodical publishing, and sound recording; (2)
heritage: museums, public archives, historic parks and sites, nature and provincial parks, and other
heritage; (3) libraries: national, public, school, university and college; (4) arts: performing arts, arts
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promoting indigenous Canadian cultural activity and a stronger sense of
national identity, they relate to a matter of inherent national concern
and are within the authority of the federal government.
This conclusion has a number of quite practical implications.
The first is that federal programmes of support to the arts and cultural
industries, such as grants and contributions delivered through agencies
like the Canada Council, do not depend solely upon the federal spending
power as their constitutional justification. This means that such federal
programmes are not an intrusion into an area of exclusive provincial
jurisdiction. These federal programmes are designed to fulfil national
purposes and aspirations, and therefore fall outside of provincial powers
and authority. Once this is recognized, the legitimacy of federal grants
and contributions to the arts and cultural industries becomes much more
secure and acceptable. Moreover, the notion that these federal grants
and contributions should be turned over to provincial control, as was
contemplated under the Charlottetown Accord, is revealed as both
unnecessary and inappropriate. Since federal grants and contributions
to the cultural community are a reflection of national aspirations, only
the national government is in a position to undertake them. Handing
the monies over to the provinces would change the whole nature of such
programmes, transforming national aspirations and objectives into
provincial ones. This is not to say that there is not ample scope for the
provinces to undertake their own programmes of grants and
contributions to the cultural sector. The point is simply that there is
legitimate constitutional space for both levels of government to
undertake programmes of this type. Neither level of government has
any right to assert exclusive or primary jurisdiction over such
programmes.
Thus, the first practical consequence of this view of federal
authority is to secure the legitimacy of a continuing federal role in this
area. A second, related consequence is to provide the federal
government with the flexibility to redesign or to expand its existing
programmes in the future, in order to respond to changing or
unforeseen circumstances. This kind of flexibility is essential, given the
fact that changes in technology can render existing forms of government
regulation in the cultural field redundant almost overnight. Consider, as
a practical example, the recent debate over the decision by Sports
Illustrated to publish a separate Canadian edition. It was alleged that
Sports Illustrated had produced a "split-run," which occurs when a
foreign publisher produces a magazine elsewhere and then substitutes
education, visual arts and crafts, and artists; and (5) other: multiculturalism and multidisciplinary
activities.
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Canadian advertisements in issues sold in Canada. The Canadian
edition of Sports Illustrated contained most of the stories of the U.S.
parent publication, but some stories were dropped and replaced with
Canadian content.155
The problem with split-runs, from the perspective of the
domestic magazine industry, is that foreign publishers can offer lower
advertisement rates than Canadian competitors since they have already
produced the magazine for the foreign market. A series of tariff
measures dating back to 1965 permit the federal government to prohibit
the sale of split-runs. However, these tariff measures apply at the
Canadian border and catch situations where a magazine is printed
elsewhere and then an attempt is made to physically transport the
product across the Canadian border. The publishers of Sports Illustrated
have taken advantage of new technology to electronically transmit the
magazine's pages to a printer in Richmond Hill, Ontario. In effect, the
magazine is being printed in Canada even though the editing and much
of the production work is done in New York. According to Revenue
Canada officials, electronic publishing was unheard of when the tariff
code was put in place, and thus the Sports Illustrated situation simply is
not covered.156
How can the federal government respond to the situation
created by this advance in technology? In particular, does it have the
constitutional authority to regulate or to prohibit the production of the
Canadian edition of Sports Illustrated? The magazine's publisher, Time
Warner Inc., might argue that the federal government lacks the required
authority. Time Warner might claim that the regulation of printing and
publishing which occurs entirely within a single province is a matter
subject to exclusive provincial jurisdiction as a matter relating to
property and civil rights in the province. Accordingly, because the
magazine is transmitted electronically into the country and is printed
here, it is not subject to federal control and regulation.
The analysis advanced in this paper reveals the fallacy in this
approach. According to the argument I have advanced, the prohibition
on split-runs does not depend constitutionally on the federal
government's ability to control goods entering the country. Rather, this
is an aspect of the federal Parliament's authority to defend and promote
a distinct Canadian identity, a matter of inherent national concern.
Whether foreign magazines are physically or electronically transported
155 See "Magazine's End Run Called Unstoppable" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (7 April
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into the country is simply irrelevant; in both cases, the effect on domestic
publishers is the same. Therefore, the federal government has full
authority to regulate in either situation, since the pith and substance of
the law remains the same.
4. The proposed amendments in relation to culture in the
CharlottetownAccord would almost certainly have reducedfederal
legislative authority.
As should now be evident, the problem with the proposed
cultural amendments in the Charlottetown Accord is that they were
based on a premise that was fundamentally flawed. This premise was
that culture was a matter primarily reserved to the provinces. The main
source of federal authority over culture was supposedly the ability of the
federal government to spend money in an area of exclusive provincial
jurisdiction. Thus, the Charlottetown Accord would have entrenched
culture as an area of exclusive provincial jurisdiction and required the
negotiation of federal-provincial agreements recognizing the lead
responsibility of the provinces in relation to culture in the province.
Had these amendments been enacted into law, they would have
reduced federal authority in at least two significant respects. First, there
was no recognition that the Parliament of Canada had any legislative
authority in relation to cultural matters.1 57 This is important since
Parliament's existing power in this field depends upon the POGG power,
which is a residual power. In other words, the POGG power applies only
in relation to matters which do not fall within classes of subjects assigned
exclusively to the provinces. At present, since culture is not listed as a
section 92 provincial power, it is open to the federal government to rely
on the POGG power in order to legislate in the cultural field. But all this
would have changed had section 92B of the Charlottetown Accord been
enacted. Under Charlottetown, culture was to be included within the
classes of matters allocated exclusively to the provinces. Therefore, any
residual power which the federal government currently possessed in
relation to culture might well have been subsumed within the new head
of provincial power. The result would have been that Parliament could
not rely on the POGG power in order to justify legislation in the cultural
field.
This change would not have been of merely academic or
doctrinal curiosity. As the Sports Illustrated example demonstrates,
changing technology and industrial innovation require new and creative
responses on the part of the federal government. I have argued that the
157 Recall that s. 92B would have recognized the role of the government, but not the
Parliament of Canada.
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federal government does possess the required flexibility at present,
because it is able to recast its existing regulations to take account of
these changing circumstances. But this might not be the case if the
federal government were deprived of the ability to argue that it
possesses the right to promote Canadian cultural industries as a matter
of inherent national concern. If the federal government were reduced to
this weakened position, it might find it more difficult to put in place new
regulations to deal with situations such as that presented by Sports
Illustrated. Deprived of the POGO power, the federal government would
be forced to identify some source of authority in the enumerated
categories in section 91 to justify regulation of electronic publishing.
Whether or not the federal government would be ultimately successful,
were it faced with this scenario, is difficult to predict. The point is
simply that its constitutional and policy manoeuvring room would have
been significantly reduced had the Charlottetown cultural amendments
come into force.
The second negative impact of the Charlottetown Accord would
have resulted from the requirement to negotiate federal-provincial
agreements recognizing the lead responsibility of the province in relation
to culture in the province. Under these agreements, the federal
government would have been forced to turn over some portion of its
existing expenditures in the cultural field to the provinces.1 58 This would
have transformed federal initiatives, designed to promote national
values and cohesion, into provincial ones. Moreover, it would have
made it much more difficult for the federal government to alter any of
its existing cultural programmes without provincial consent, much less
undertake new programmes. Having recognized the lead responsibility
of the provinces in the constitution, how could the federal government
justify any new initiatives without first obtaining provincial approval?
Some might argue that the federal government is already
abandoning its support for the cultural industries and thus the
implementation of the Charlottetown Accord would have made little
practical difference. With or without Charlottetown, it might be argued,
the end result is the diminishment of the federal role in relation to
culture. However, this argument fails to notice the important difference
between policy change and constitutional change. It is one thing for the
federal government to alter or to reduce its cultural programmes at the
level of policy choice; but it is another thing entirely to entrench those
changes in the Constitution. What was significant about the
158 That this was the practical result of these agreements is made clear by the discussion in the
Beaudoin-Dobbie Report. See supranote 103 at 78-79.
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Charlottetown Accord was that it proposed to constitutionally entrench
a primary role for the provinces in relation to culture. This would have
meant that any future federal government which sought to reverse the
decisions taken in 1992 would have been unable to do so. In fact, any
future federal government which sought to assert a leading role in the
cultural field would have been vulnerable to legal challenges from the
provinces on the basis that provincial governments had the lead
responsibility over culture.
Thus, the Charlottetown Accord, although justified on the basis
that it merely entrenched the constitutional status quo, in fact
represented a significant change to the existing division of authority over
culture. It entailed a permanent reduction in the ability of the federal
Parliament to intervene in the national interest. Had the drafters of the
Accord wished merely to reflect the existing division of powers, rather
than reduce national authority, then at least two important amendments
would have been required to proposed sections 92B and 92C. The first
change would have been to recognize culture as an area of shared or
concurrent jurisdiction, rather than as an area of exclusive provincial
jurisdiction. Secondly, the reference to the lead responsibility of the
provinces over culture should have been changed to refer to the joint
responsibility of the federal and provincial governments in the cultural
domain.
It may be, as some drafters of the Accord apparently believed,
that amendments along these lines would have made the provisions
unacceptable in the province of Quebec.1 59 Certainly, changes along the
lines outlined above would have directly contradicted provincial claims
to the effect that culture is already an area of exclusive provincial
responsibility under the Constitution. But these provincial claims about
exclusive authority bear little resemblance to the existing constitutional
reality. If the objective of the exercise is merely to reflect faithfully the
current constitutional position, then any amendments dealing with
culture must explicitly recognize the legislative authority of the
Parliament of Canada. Otherwise the result is an attempt to amend the
Constitution by stealth, in which amendments that would effect real and
significant changes would be justified on the basis that they merely
entrench the status quo.

159 See letter of Hon. Joe Clark to Ms. Penny Dickens, supra note 121: "Some provinces,
notably Quebec, have long seen culture as a provincial responsibility- an explicit assertion of federal
jurisdiction would simply have been unacceptable."
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V. CONCLUSION
When the Massey Commission reported over forty years ago, it
found that cultural life in Canada suffered from a profound case of
malnutrition. "Good will alone can do little for a starving plant," the
Commission noted. "[I]f the cultural life of Canada is anaemic, it must
be nourished ... This is a task for shared effort in all fields of
government, federal, provincial and local." 160
Perhaps the most fundamental accomplishment of the Massey
Report was to change our view of the role of government in relation to
the cultural sector. In the 1950s, Canadians still debated whether
government had a proper part to play in cultural affairs. Today, it is
taken for granted that cultural activity in Canada will flourish only with
active and continuing state support.161 The federal government, in
particular, has a key role to play, since only the national government can
promote common values which unite Canadians in all parts of the
country. As Massey argued so eloquently in 1951, the federal
government has a particular responsibility to "nurture what we have in
common and resist those influences which could impair, and even
destroy, our integrity. In our search we have thus been made aware of
what can serve our country in a double sense: what can make it great and
62
what can make it one."1
While this perspective on the important responsibility of the
federal government is now commonplace, it somehow failed to surface in
the recent debate surrounding the cultural provisions in the
Charlottetown Accord. Instead, the primary focus of this recent
discussion was on constitutionally recognizing provincial roles and
responsibilities in the cultural domain. The motivation behind this
approach to the issue was widely understood: in the wake of the failure
of the Meech Lake Accord, it was seen as particularly important to
recognize or affirm Quebee's constitutional responsibilities. The
Quebec government has a particular responsibility for preserving and
promoting Quebec's distinct identity. Thus emerged the idea of
recognizing or affirming in the Constitution the role of the Quebec
government in relation to the cultural sector.
This idea had a deceptive appeal, since it appeared to do nothing
more than affirm the status quo. It is widely recognized that the
1 60

See supranote 27 at 272.

1 61

See R. Fulford, "Introduction" in Ostry, supra note 12 at xi.

1 62

Supra note 27 at 271.
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provinces in general, and Quebec in particular, are already extremely
active in the cultural sphere. What could be the harm in explicitly
recognizing Quebec's existing cultural responsibilities in the
Constitution? Indeed, a similar affirmation could be accorded to the
other provinces, since their cultural policies, while less developed than
Quebec's, were also surely worthy of constitutional recognition.
The problem, of course, was how to affirm provincial powers
without interfering with the legitimate role of the federal government. It
is certainly true that the provinces already exercise important
responsibilities in the cultural sphere. But those responsibilities are
nowhere mentioned in the Constitution. The moment one attempts to
write down the precise nature and extent of the provincial role, there is a
risk of getting it wrong. Either there will be an error on the side of
describing the provincial role too narrowly, in which case the provinces
will be upset, or the provincial role will be described in overly broad
terms, in which case the federal government will have indirectly been
forced to sacrifice its powers.
The chances of making either of these two mistakes would
appear to be quite high. The basic difficulty is that different
governments and stakeholders may well have quite different and even
contradictory perceptions about the way in which current arrangements
operate. Those differing and even contradictory perceptions do not
pose any real problem as long as there is no need to agree on these
matters. But the moment it becomes necessary to write down a common
definition of the status quo, the existence of contradictory perceptions
poses a major stumbling block. The difficulties are all the greater if it is
proposed to include such a description of the status quo in the
Constitution, given the permanence and high symbolism of
constitutional language.
This appears to be exactly the problem with agreeing on a
definition of the constitutional status quo in the cultural field. The
different levels of government, as well as the stakeholders in the field,
have contrasting ideas about the way in which governments currently
share responsibilities in this area. Quebec, in particular, sees itself as
having a particular responsibility over cultural affairs. Quebec
governments have consistently denounced federal cultural policy as an
intrusion into an area of exclusive provincial jurisdiction. This
continuing debate is not a real problem as long as the Constitution says
nothing about culture. But the moment one attempts to define the
responsibilities of the different levels of government over cultural
matters, one stirs up a hornet's nest that will prove very difficult to
contain.
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Thus, the authors of the cultural provisions in the Charlottetown
Accord, although well intentioned, were headed for trouble from the
very start. The outcome of the process, as reflected in the text of the
Charlottetown Accord, was not terribly surprising, given the parties
around the table and the dynamics of the negotiations. The federal
government was outnumbered by the provinces, and the negotiations
were conducted in the shadow of an overwhelming political imperative
to strike a unanimous agreement.1 63 The federal government ended up
agreeing to amendments that, although ostensibly justified on the basis
that they merely codified the status quo, in reality represented a
significant reduction in its own powers. The cultural amendments
proposed in the Charlottetown Accord essentially adopted the views of
the provinces, and particularly the province of Quebec, as to the nature
of the existing constitutional arrangements. The Accord failed to
recognize the very broad constitutional authority already enjoyed by the
federal government in cultural matters. Had these amendments been
incorporated into the Constitution, over time they would have
significantly reduced the ability of the federal government to promote
national values and a sense of common identity amongst Canadians in all
parts of the country.
The larger lesson which emerges is simply that one should not
undertake lightly the task of including descriptions of existing political
arrangements in the Constitution. Proposals to entrench descriptions of
the political status quo in the Constitution have undeniable political
appeal, since they appear to be cost-free ways of updating the
Constitution. But, as the debate over these recent cultural amendments
reveals, such exercises are rarely cost-free or free of trouble. They
immediately run the risk of being bogged down in endless debate over
the precise nature of the existing arrangements. More troubling is the
prospect that certain governments or interests will attempt to make gains
and improve their current position, all in the guise of merely describing
the status quo. The result is to confuse or to distort a set of existing
practices which appear to function tolerably well. If and when
Canadians return to the task of debating their constitution, we would do
well to keep this fundamental lesson firmly in view of all the participants
in the process.
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For a detailed analysis of the dynamics of the negotiations leading to the Charlottetown
Accord, see P. Monahan, "The Sounds of Silence", in McRoberts & Monahan, eds., supra note 1.

